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I gave a talk last Friday in which I began by considering set theory. There are two perspectives on what set theory does. The first [more correct one] is that it's hard to give a convincing example of any mathematical concept that clearly sits outside of the comfort zone of being foundable in set theory. The second [naïve] one is that students in a typical intro to proofs course are taught set theory and then learn concepts such as functions and families and then go on to do math with these concepts, so one might think that set theory is an optimal framework for discussing such concepts
The talk was titled "diagram models", and the first example that I considered was taking a model of set theory [whatever that means] and replacing it with the model in which every object now denotes a pair of sets, i.e. the model Set × Set
After some discussion, the first observation made was that this "model" violates LEM. However, even if we work in a constructive set theory, I still think that this model violates extensionality, for any meaningful way that I can think of formulating extensionality with a global membership ∈ operation
However, all of the basic concepts of functions and families [i.e. pi-types and universes] make sense equally well in a diagram model
I then argued that type theory is the optimal framework for studying concepts like functions and families in maximal generality, such that if at any point in the future you have an idea for a new model, you automatically get All Of Mathematics Ever Written Down In Type Theory for free
v.s. in set theory, it would be hard to make the case that you could not give the construction of what is meant by the structure of such a model, viz. defining what is meant by a pair of sets and what it means to be a morphism between such pairs, but you would have to manually rewrite all of the mathematics that you wanted to port to this setting as it would not be an actual semantic model of the syntax of set theory
This was the intro and the rest of the talk was basically an elaboration of the concept of a Category With Families
7 messages were moved here from #community: our work > Mike Shulman by Mike Shulman.
Interesting. My first question is in what sense the "model" of pairs of sets violates LEM? The topos is Boolean, so it satisfies LEM.
We can consider a multi-modal theory whose diagram mode interprets into and that has modalities and that land in the discrete mode. I want to say that assuming LEM as an axiom (i.e. in the global context) in the diagram mode implies contradiction in the discrete mode
Consider
If we have then , or equivalently , conversely given we get or . This is not an anti-classical result, but it shows that LEM cannot hold in an arbitrary context
This is just an extended way of saying that there is a diamond of four truth values
No, it doesn't show that LEM can't hold. It shows that doesn't hold in an empty context, and that doesn't hold in an empty context, but it doesn't show that can't hold in an empty context. And in fact if you work it out you can see that .
This is the difference betweeen a topos being Boolean and being two-valued. A Boolean topos is one whose subobject lattices are Boolean algebras; they could have lots of different elements, but as long as they are Boolean algebras, it holds in the internal logic of the topos that "every truth value is either true or false" because for every proposition the proposition is equal to , even if itself is neither equal to nor .
A two-valued topos is one with exactly two subterminal objects. This is incomparable to Booleanness in general: a topos can be Boolean without being two-valued, or two-valued without being Boolean.
Oh, this is a good point. LEM would fail in , though, right?
Yes, LEM fails in , because there you have a truth value such that , but , so .
Next question is how you were thinking of formulating extensionality. (-: One can build a model of set theory internal to any topos as well, with extensionality along with the other axioms. And in I think it will just result in pairs of ordinary sets.
I saw that in the HoTT book there is a construction of such a model V with a membership predicate as a HIT, however a global extensionality axiom in the theory shouldn't be about a specific set of symbol meanings that you can construct
On the other hand, there isn't really a natural interpretation of what means in type theory, is there?
Or at least, it is wrong to interpret elements as global elements
Right, type theory doesn't have a global . But that's a different thing from saying that extensionality is violated; by the latter I would understand that you have fixed a meaning of and the resulting interpretation of the statement is false.
I guess that the original question is whether you could interpret every statement written in set theory as saying something about
What this would mean is secretly replacing every set with a pair of sets and every function with a pair of functions, as opposed to interpreting this inside of an inner model of set theory that could be constructed inside of
I think in the case of you could probably do that because it's so simple.
And I think that would end up coinciding with the model of set theory constructed in the usual way inside the topos , just because everything you do in is "componentwise".
In particular, the truth value of would be .
Hmm, my intuitions probably came from thinking of a model of set theory as being something that looked analogous to the categorical semantics of type theory. So every set gets interpreted as an object in the category and such that you can talk about
On the other hand, if you start constructing a model instead by explaining what means, I think that you can effectively restrict to an inner construction of V in the topos
Having judgments in a context as being primitive is what I meant by "replacing every function with a pair of functions"
It still feels to me that something is lost from the richness of if you start with . What do you think about this?
Set theory as usually formulated doesn't have a notion of "term", so if you're building a model of set theory you shouldn't expect to be able to talk about . The fundamental structure of (membership-based) set theory is the predicate .
Obviously I'm not a real big fan of membership-based set theory myself for other reasons, but at a technical level I think it does capture basically all the internal logic of a topos when formulated carefully.
Could be made into a model of constructive set theory?
Astra Kolomatskaia said:
It still feels to me that something is lost from the richness of if you start with . What do you think about this?
I think my intuition here is that pi-types and universes in the membership based model don't coincide with their type theoretic counterparts
For pi-types, this is clear because the intro rule uses terms in a context, which we just don't have as a primitive notion
Well, when you're working in set theory, you define "pi-types" differently:
They're characterized differently, because as you say set theory doesn't have the machinery to give type-theoretic intro/elim rules, but they turn out to be equivalent semantically.
I guess that they might actually be pi-types if you derive as being defined in terms of
Mike Shulman said:
Well, when you're working in set theory, you define "pi-types" differently:
On a side note, is that how one would define dependent products in ETCS or SEAR as well?
Astra Kolomatskaia said:
Could be made into a model of constructive set theory?
A model of constructive set theory can be constructed from any topos. The HIT construction in the HoTT Book is a highbrow approach, but the more traditional one is to consider internal well-founded relations. This dates back to Cole, Mitchell, and Osius in the mid-20th century; I wrote a paper myself that does some systematization and comparison to category theoretic axiom systems.
That makes sense
Astra Kolomatskaia said:
I guess that they might actually be pi-types if you derive as being defined in terms of
Specifically means is a family of sets over the elements of and means a dependent function, defined set theoretically
The main limitation is that these straightforward constructions don't always "see" the whole topos: they only see the part that can be equipped with well-founded relations. In a classical topos this is all of it, but in a constructive topos it could miss part. But there's a fancier approach due to Awodey, Butz, Simpson, and Streicher that is able to "see" the whole topos.
Astra Kolomatskaia said:
Specifically means is a family of sets over the elements of and means a dependent function, defined set theoretically
Right: you basically start from your model of set theory and build a model of type theory in the usual way.
Mike Shulman said:
The main limitation is that these straightforward constructions don't always "see" the whole topos: they only see the part that can be equipped with well-founded relations. In a classical topos this is all of it, but in a constructive topos it could miss part. But there's a fancier approach due to Awodey, Butz, Simpson, and Streicher that is able to "see" the whole topos.
So, for example, extensionality would say that , right?
Madeleine Birchfield said:
On a side note, is that how one would define dependent products in ETCS or SEAR as well?
Not exactly, because ETCS and SEAR don't have a notion of non-disjoint union. But you can do something similar using a disjoint union.
Astra Kolomatskaia said:
So, for example, extensionality would say that , right?
No. has no global elements, but that doesn't mean that holds internally.
What does the argument that say, if anything?
Well, it implies that has no global elements, since any such global element would also yield a global element of in .
Mike Shulman said:
No, it doesn't show that LEM can't hold. It shows that doesn't hold in an empty context, and that doesn't hold in an empty context, but it doesn't show that can't hold in an empty context. And in fact if you work it out you can see that .
I guess that the argument that I gave at the start breaks down in that its casework derives contradiction in by way of using different modalities, so there is no unified modal function like
I would have said it breaks down because LEM doesn't satisfy canonicity. Postulating doesn't tell you that for some particular you have either or .
Mike Shulman said:
Astra Kolomatskaia said:
Specifically means is a family of sets over the elements of and means a dependent function, defined set theoretically
Right: you basically start from your model of set theory and build a model of type theory in the usual way.
Ok, then the observation is that if you start from a model of type theory, and construct an internal model of set theory, called , then construct the derived model of set theory , and construct its internal model of type theory, then that construction does not agree with the diagram model construction on two points in type theory
At least not definitionally; would there be any equivalence?
We can also consider the construction [set theory] -> [type theory] -> [type theory] -> [set theory]
(Is it possible to move this to a different stream?)
I don't have permission to, but pressing m
gives the interface for moving a whole thread
For a general diagram construction, I think neither of these squares commutes, because the direction [type theory] -> [set theory] is lossy as I mentioned earlier. (The other direction can be lossy too for weak set theories, but not for the stronger set theories used mostly in practice; chapter 9 of my paper is about this sort of question with type theory replaced by a "structural" set theory like ETCS.)
But I think in the simple case of , the direction that starts with set theory is not lossy, because when a model of type theory is constructed from a model of set theory everything in it is well-founded, and that carries over to since everything is componentwise.
Astra Kolomatskaia said:
I don't have permission to, but pressing
m
gives the interface for moving a whole thread
I guess one thing we could do is move all the messages in this topic to a new one in some other stream, and rename this one back to your personal topic.