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I'm trying to understand forcing, and this post by Aaron Scott got me started once again:
https://scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=4974
Ever since then I've been wondering if we can describe or interpret one of the cardinals between and .
Forcing is inherently nonconstructive, so it's not at all obvious what the answer should be. I think that these are relative to the model of ZFC we're looking at.
I wrote about this here:
https://twitter.com/RAnachro/status/1335587810280136704
I've been wrestling with Cohen's forcing again. And I have questions. Here's what got me restarted into this topic, and much of the following is inspired by it: Scott Aaronson: The Complete Idiot’s Guide to the [...] Continuum Hypothesis: Part 1 https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=4974
- Refurio Anachro (@RAnachro)Basically, I claimed that there are smaller topoi, like the effective topos, where everything is computable, and that that example limits the number of reals to . But I grew suspicion that I'm doing it wrong! I just don't know enough about these things to be sure! So I came here for help.
By the way, in that thread I said I didn't quite understand König's theoren, but that has changed. Here's a discussion about it:
https://twitter.com/RAnachro/status/1342950207315734535
@silvascientist @CujoUniversity @mathemensch @AndresECaicedo1 @littmath @SC_Griffith I see. Yes, that's nice and crisp way to put it! Looking at König's paper again it now seems crystal clear. He has a rather explanative style, and he surely would have drawn a similar picture had he known Gödel and Cohen's results, but he wrote it in 1904.
- Refurio Anachro (@RAnachro)Refurio Anachro said:
I'm trying to understand forcing, and this post by Aaron Scott got me started once again:
Hi! Long time no see. You mean Aaron Scottson, the famous expert on quantum computing. :upside_down: He has promised to explain forcing sometime on his blog, so I'm waiting for that.
Refurio Anachro said:
Forcing is inherently nonconstructive,
My spidey sense are tickling. Is this true? I think the Boolean models/topos theoretic avenues are quite constructive in practice.
John Baez said:
Refurio Anachro said:
I'm trying to understand forcing, and this post by Aaron Scott got me started once again:
Hi! Long time no see. You mean Aaron Scottson, the famous expert on quantum computing. :upside_down: He has promised to explain forcing sometime on his blog, so I'm waiting for that.
*Scott Aaronson :laughing:
Nice to meet you, @John Baez , it's been too long. Yes, of course, it's Scott Aaronson XD
He has promised to explain forcing
I linked part one of his 'Complete Idiot's Guide to the Independence of the Continuum Hypothesis', which seems to be just that. He might well cover my questions whenever he gets there, but I just can't sit still for an indefinite amount of time...
Not quite sure why I didn't escalate this to the comment section below his post right away, and I think I should try that later today. Maybe, because there should be some experts on topos theory here, who might be better equipped to spot how silly my gueswork really is. Toposes, i wanted to learn more about toposes. Sigh.
Thanks, @Matteo Capucci! I might be reading too much into it, but your spidey sense seems to give me some hope that I might not be entirely on the wrong track! You don't happen to have some search terms or even references about this boolean approach to forcing, do you?
Anyways, thanks for the correction of Scott's name, it was clearly too late for me!
:joy: It was really meant to be a correction, more of a funny remark about the double mistake
BTW I've learnt about topos-theoretic forcing from MacLane and Moerdijk book Sheaves in geometry and logic. There's a wonderful section walking through the construction in Chapter IX, iirc. It's the chapter on logic.
Oh also Dana Scott's article on boolean valued models for forcing is very easy to read an very insightful
Unfortunately I don't have the title at hand
MacLane and Moerdijk's book Sheaves in geometry and logic
Dana Scott […] on boolean valued models for forcing
Great, I'll have a look at this! Thanks again, @Matteo Capucci!
Usually, for me, the joy of learning exceeds feelings of frustration I might have when getting corrected. But then again, I don't do papers, my job doesn't depend on it, and it's mostly me having fun on social media. So it may be easier for me to stomach any or rather the eventual embarassment.
I am not in any respect an expert on topos-theoretic forcing. But my memory is that category theorists explain it in three steps: (1) construct a suitable category (often a poset) or site of "forcing conditions", and then take sheaves on that site, (2) pass from there to a Boolean topos by taking double negation sheaves (I'm pretty sure this step is constructive). So far I think this is very similar to consideration of Boolean-valued models. Then (3) collapse to a two-valued model by taking a "filterquotient" along an ultrafilter. Generally, the existence of such a suitable ultrafilter will involve a nonconstructive aspect, unless I'm confused of course. I hope someone more knowledgeable passes by to confirm or refute.
That's exactly right Todd. It is notable though that the last step (which, as you note, is the only non constructive one) isn't strictly necessary. The topos of -sheaves on the forcing conditions is already a model of the theory, although a somewhat nonstandard one.
Boolean valued models is what you get when you do the same construction and remove the topos-theoretic framing, only to leave the logical content
In other words, Boolean valued logic can be used to produce a tripos whose associated topos is equivalent to the sheaf-theoretic one
Matteo Capucci said:
John Baez said:
Hi! Long time no see. You mean Aaron Scottson, the famous expert on quantum computing. :upside_down: He has promised to explain forcing sometime on his blog, so I'm waiting for that.
*Scott Aaronson :laughing:
I was just teasing Refurio...
Matteo Capucci said:
That's exactly right Todd. It is notable though that the last step (which, as you note, is the only non constructive one) isn't strictly necessary. The topos of -sheaves on the forcing conditions is already a model of the theory, although a somewhat nonstandard one.
Yes, I've often heard that said, and I myself accept it. But wonder if a traditional set theorist would ever accept that as not cheating or skimping.
Oh yeah, they wouldn't :) in the end, it's a trade-off between being constructive and being two-valued. You choose what you need!
One thing I found a bit frustrating about the treatment of forcing in Mac Lane and Moerdijk's book is that they don't carry it through all the way to proving that there are (traditional) models of ZF where AC or CH fails. Or at least sketching the proof. I guess they didn't want to get tangled up in that stuff, but an application of topos theory to traditional logic would help sell topos theory and maybe also help some of us understand forcing. I haven't read this section in a long time, but at the time I felt the didn't solve the "last mile" problem - you know, like running fiber optic cable to your town but not to your house.
You mean finding models that satisfy replacement, foundation, etc?
Yes, models of all the ZF axioms, that are models in the sense of traditional set theory - set or class-valued models.
I bet Mac Lane and Moerdijk could have sketched this stuff without sinking into a morass of detail.
But I imagine they thought it was too distracting. Part of the point of topos theory is to avoid a bunch of this messy traditional stuff.
Was it even known how to interpret some of the ZF axioms in a topos at the time? The stuff in that book can probably only handle bounded versions of some axioms in an obvious way, no?
The difficulty there though is that you have to re-extract the cumulative hierarchy from the topos of sets which in itself is a whole task
Okay, so maybe it's really hard, or at least tiring. But then they should have said a bit more about why...
I guess there were known solutions, of which that is one. But I was thinking of 'stack semantics,' which wasn't.
The stack semantics paper also says that the cumulative hierarchy approach requires completeness, which isn't necessarily preserved by filterquotients, so that could be an extra problem. :smile:
John Baez said:
Yes, models of all the ZF axioms, that are models in the sense of traditional set theory - set or class-valued models.
:thinking: I'm not understanding your complaint, John. Shall they have talked about the non-topos theoretic way to do forcing? It seems beyond the point!
Also there's a section about algebraic set theory and models of bZF in topoi.
It seems that there are two distinct aspects here:
You can deal with ZF models of set theory while still using topos theoretic forcing, but it means you have to also deal with the second aspect too.
Matteo Capucci said:
John Baez said:
Yes, models of all the ZF axioms, that are models in the sense of traditional set theory - set or class-valued models.
:thinking: I'm not understanding your complaint, John. Shall they have talked about the non-topos theoretic way to do forcing?
No, I was saying I wanted them to say more about how topos-theoretic methods can be used to prove results about traditional logic.
But maybe they said enough and I just wasn't satisfied on my first reading. Let me look. On page 279 they say they'll prove
Theorem 1. There exists a Boolean topos satisfying the axiom of choice, in which the continuum hypothesis fails.
I was wanting them to go a bit further and talk about how to use this to get a traditional model of ZF in which the continuum hypothesis fails.
But in fact they do say a little about this:
A Boolean Grothendieck topos... is a perfectly good "universe of sets" in which to do classical mathematics, but it is not exactly a model of ZF. However, it is not difficult to obtain a model of ZF from such a topos, by mimicking hte construction of the cumulative hierarchy , defined for ordinal numbers as , etc., inside the topos. (This worked out in [Fourman, 1980].)
So maybe that's enough.
My point is that to sell topos theory to logicians, it's useful to assure them that topos theory can prove results they're already interested in.
If the problem of translating the topos-theoretic results into ZF is complicated and/or boring, it's fine to offload it to a reference.
(Btw, I had dinner at Charles Fourman's house at CT2019 - he lives in Edinburgh, and he's a well-established computer scientist now. I wish I'd asked him about this stuff - mainly, what it felt like to work on that project.)
Surely though if someone is interested in proving complex independence results about ZFC in particular, they’ll just work directly with the cumulative hierarchy.
After all, there must be a reason why topos theoretic approaches to forcing didn’t take off in the the main set theory circles.
Despite classes not really existing in ZFC, it is in the end really a class theory rather than a set theory. In contrast, the notion of class in ETCS doesn’t make much sense.
Maybe something like algebraic set theory is closer then to how working ZF style set theorists think of the universe of sets (rather than just the topos of sets)
Actually, I think there's probably a good number of set theorists/logicians of the non-categorical sort who are (or say they are) open to learning more about the topos-theoretic approach, but what some of them wonder about is: how is this really different from the Boolean-valued model approach of Scott & Solovay (who are part of the in-club)?
Actually, though, what might be good in the long run is just accept the fact that most set theorists are set in the ways of generic filters and such, and really address other people out there, the young, who might be open to the more 'algebraic' approach afforded by the topos theory methods. In effect, feel free to ignore the traditionalists, until they start showing interest.
Fawzi Hreiki said:
After all, there must be a reason why topos theoretic approaches to forcing didn’t take off in the the main set theory circles.
One reason is that many traditional set theorists don't understand topos theory. Another reason is that some set theorists consider topos theory a competitor and prefer to "battle" it in places like the Foundations of Mathematics mailing list rather than to learn about it.
There may be other, better reasons!
But I think in the end set theorists and topos theorists have a lot to learn from each other... and eventually the "battle" will fade away.
Todd Trimble said:
Actually, though, what might be good in the long run is just accept the fact that most set theorists are set in the ways of generic filters and such, and really address other people out there, the young, who might be open to the more 'algebraic' approach afforded by the topos theory methods. In effect, feel free to ignore the traditionalists, until they start showing interest.
That's really the only thing that works. The nLab has a great potential for luring young mathematicians into thinking about logic in more flexible, modern ways.
Old set theorists are set in their ways. :upside_down:
It's fun sometimes to go into the FOM list archives to see Colin McLarty vs. everyone else but in the end I doubt there were many converts. You're probably right that the soft diplomacy approach via the nLab and the blogs (particularly yours) and this Zulip are more effective.
Im happy to be ignorant of either side, I just want to know about a model where CH does not hold, and we know what those pesky cardinals in between are and what they mean! Welp.
I know that there are models of ZF where , the cardinality of the continuum, is as big as you like in terms of alephs. Like, it can be . But I don't understand these models.
I "know" it just in the sense that I've been assured it's true by people I trust.
But anyway, in my example the "pesky cardinals in between" are .
Yes, I know that we can we can make the cardinality of c any cardinal that cannot be written as the supremum of countably many cardinals. That includes , but isn't allowed, due to the theorem of König I mentioned in the OP. Then is okay again, and so on. I think the first allowed limit cardinal is the next such being , and so on.
What really interests me is a model that isn't nebulous in a nonconstructive way, such that its is an interesting or otherwise meaningful cardinal with respect to the model. I guessed earlier that maybe the effective topos and make sense superficially, but I feel that that isn't even compatible with König's theorem, and it's really just a wild guess! I have no way to check it, or even a good reason to actually believe it's true.
I don't know if any of these other models are "constructive" in some sense of that term. That's a fun question that someone should know something about!
On a vaguely related note: no nonstandard models of arithmetic have the operations + and being computable. So you have to learn to live with that, if you're studying nonstandard models of arithmetic!
Sure, I'd be happy to jump through all sorts of hoops, just to arrive at a setting where we can look at a model A's c from the outside (from a model B) and make actual sense of it being countable (as seen from B).
You see, people (past me included) misunderstand forcing in the sense that there might be cardinals between and , but that's not how it works! In fact, forcing extends a small model, where CH holds, by adding new reals, making the earlier c look countable in the new model. At least, that's what Scott seems to say.
There must be an interesting pair of models A, B, where is an interesting ordinal in B. (I hope that's not too nonsensical)
Well, in the models where CH fails there are cardinals between and . Let's not deny that.
But the way you get these models may shed new light on what's "really going on" with these cardinals between and .
There are countable models of ZFC! Scott says about these:
each model of ZFC thinks it has uncountably many sets, many themselves of uncountable cardinality, even if “from the outside” the model is countable.
So the smaller models (like Gödel's universe) thinks that but in Cohen's models that cardinal is smaller than what they see as .
You might want to read Scott's post starting from that quote, and you'll see what I mean.
Is it actually known that the continuum hypothesis must hold in countable models? Those two things aren't obviously related to me.
Also, can't look countable in any model, I believe.
Be sure not to conflate what appears true internal to the model vs. what appears externally true about the model.
Shooting from the hip: wouldn't downward Lowenheim-Skolem say 'no'? As always, one has to be careful around internal-external distinctions, but in a conversation about these things, this should go without saying.
Oh yeah, presumably ZF+¬CH has infinite models, so countable models.
I admit I'm having trouble understanding what the original question is. I guess that the second cardinal in Refurio's OP is a Beth cardinal? (I don't read Hebrew.) Is it just ? Refurio, is the goal to tease out an explanation of topos-theoretic forcing here on this Zulip? Or how far have you drilled down into this topic?
can't look countable in any model
That's not necessary, but I think it can look countable in another Cohen extended model (which, of course, would have its own c itself sees as uncountable).
??????????
What do you mean it can "look countable"?
Something like Cantor's diagonal argument shows that internally is uncountable. It may be modeled by a set that is countable according to the metatheory.
Yes, @Dan Doel, that sounds right!
Yes, that's beth, @Todd Trimble. It's defined relative to a model, right?
Yes. I still don't really know what sort of answer it is that you're looking for, i.e., what will be satisfactory to you. In order to find out, we might have to get into matters of your background. (Starting from ground zero in this zulip could be quite a long haul.) What have you tried reading so far?
I'm not sure what I want to "tease out". I think I'm looking for a pair of models where the smaller inner is some easy to understand cardinal. might be easy enough, see my wild guess above. But other ones might do just as well.
I'd be happy to do some reading myself, and we really shouldn't need to start from zero. I wouldn't want to strain anybody's generosity. So if you see yourself able to give me some hints I'd be glad to work on them. Heck, knowing that I'm not asking for something impossible or silly would already be great!
I got myself a copy of Moerdijk and MacLane's book 'Sheaves in Geometry an Logic', but haven't started reading yet. It looks like fun.
What does "smaller inner " mean? Does it mean that the set that models the internal looks bigger externally? That is also probably unrelated to CH-type statements inside the model.
Mac Lane & Moerdijk is a really valiant effort that tries to steer a middle course between accessible pedagogy and getting the reader close to professional-level understanding. So I do think that is not a bad place to start. Consider also something like Kunen's book on set theory, which is more traditional but covers lots of ground in not too many pages (I've dipped into it, and found him helpful). Anyway you cut it, there will be some technical demands. There could also be some unlearning involved -- it sounds like you want a super-constructive approach. I can say that aleph sub church-kleene ordinal is not going to work, because of internal cofinality restraints. The truly original insights of Cohen must not be underestimated!
I don't really understand that answer, either. Does it mean that you can't build a forcing model of due to the details?
Oh (Dan), you wrote . I was referring to a countable ordinal, of countable cofinality. I'm sure you realize that cannot have (internally) countable cofinality.
(There's something called König's lemma that's relevant here. There are two called by that name, but only one is relevant here.)
You mean, more like ? Yeah, I would expect that to not work. I guess I was confused because the was already mentioned.
I was copying down exactly what Refurio wrote, which was , where the subscript is the (countable) Church-Kleene ordinal. I was saying this could not be a possibility, because of König's lemma. I'm afraid that I don't know what signifies, I was just quoting that to say that's not what I was referring to.
I thought that was the actual notation for the Church-Kleene ordinal.
Maybe it is. If so, it fails by the aforementioned lemma.
Oh, well, in that case, I don't know enough about forcing aleph numbers to know that won't work. :smile:
Okay. The nLab article on König's lemma (written by me) might be less easy to follow than other standard sources. But it's a nice fact to know. I do recommend to anyone's attention the beautiful Easton's theorem, which puts very precise constraints on what is possible. But the proof is pretty advanced forcing theory. I think David Roberts (who occasionally tunes in here) is knowledgeable.
Here I'll saying something that Todd already said... but I'll say it slower and louder:
Refurio Anachro said:
There are countable models of ZFC!
There are countable models of every theory in first-order logic that you can write down with countably many symbols. This is the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem.
We can't really name uncountably many different things with just finitely many sentences written down using countably many symbols. So it turns out that whatever properties we say we want a mathematical structure to have, there's there's a countable structure with all those properties (if there's any structure with all those properties.)
(Urgh. I see the nLab title is König's theorem, not lemma.)
Dan Doel said:
Is it actually known that the continuum hypothesis must hold in countable models? Those two things aren't obviously related to me.
No, they're completely unrelated. There are countable models where CH holds, and countable models where it doesn't. Whatever finite collection of axioms you list (in a language with countably many symbols), if it has any models at all it has a countable model.
@Todd Trimble - if you want to understand what Refurio is wondering about, you could look at Scott Aaaronson's post about the continuum hypothesis:
https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=4974
This is Scott clearing his throat before he tries to explain forcing. (He hasn't gotten around to doing that yet.)
Well, actually you might have to read the 364 (!) comments on this post, where people try to lure Scott into going into more detail, and he valiantly tries to answer all his questions. You probably can't stomach that...
I think Refurio's questions are arising out of this stew...
I think I have read the page on Easton's theorem, although it's not something I've retained.
I guess what I'm missing is assorted facts about cardinals, though (because I don't really study set theory). Does having countable cofinality mean that also has countable cofinality?
I don't actually think Refurio should read Sheaves in Geometry and Logic if he's trying to understand what models of are like. It would first require a couple years of thought about category theory.
I actually think the fastest way for Refurio to understand more about models of is to either:
1) wait for Scott to explain them
or
2) ask Scott on his blog.
I guess, is cofinal?
I think as long as is a limit ordinal, is cofinal in .
In other words, I think the function is "continuous".
John Baez said:
I don't actually think Refurio should read Sheaves in Geometry and Logic if he's trying to understand what models of are like. It would first require a couple years of thought about category theory.
You might be right. (Hence my earlier question about background.)
He's not a category theorist; I've mainly met him on G+ and Twitter talking about various other kinds of math.
Okay. Math is hard. :upside_down: I don't know any royal road to forcing, but at least some of this thread points to what is not possible, and already this is valuable knowledge.
Refurio Anachro said:
So the smaller models (like Gödel's universe) thinks that but in Cohen's models that cardinal is smaller than what they see as .
Umm, by definition. Do you mean ?
Todd Trimble said:
I guess that the second cardinal in Refurio's OP is a Beth cardinal? (I don't read Hebrew.) Is it just ?
Correct.
John is right, I am no expert on category theory, even tough I have stared at the subject for a long time now, and I believe I know some of the basics pretty well. I'm quite curious about sheaves and topoi, so I will give the according literature a try, no matter if it helps my current adventure or not. And yes, Scott Aaronson has been "clearing his throat", dropping lots of quite possibly unrelated stuff, hence I wouldn't expect anyone to read his blog post completely, let alone those 350+ comments, just to follow my thoughts!
I'm also aware that he promised to continue this series, but looking at it I'm not convinced that he will manage to do so in the next couple of months, that's why I decided to attempt making my own way towards understanding forcing. And I think I had some success, but I'm very frustrated that what I've learned about his approach does not seem to tell us much about the meaning of those "cardinals in between". It should be easy to present one such cardinal, describe how it comes about, and what it means, right? That is what I'm trying to do!
For the record, I'm not directly afraid of technicalities, but I may not be able to invest a lot of time to build a larger body of background knowledge, because I'm doing all this in my free time. In my experience, quite often the ideas and concepts can be explained in prose (or actually need to be, but that is often not written down), but, as we see in this thread, clarity may suffer if I don't know how to use jargon properly. I'm sorry for that. I'm trying.
The result by Löwenheim-Skolem, up- and downward, is known to me. I couldn't (yet) follow their proof completely, though. I have errorneously used CK as a subscript for the Church-Kleene ordinal, and it's conventionally written . Also, writing things like seems like a very good idea. Thanks for that!
I've read and I believe I understand König's paper. I also sensed that it applies to the Church-Kleene ordinal (either as index to , or as relative cardinality ), but I am still confused about the relationship between models, and what they then think various cardinalities are, hence it appeared in my favorite wild guess. That is intentional to emphasize my confusion: If the effective topos cannot count beyond , is that then still a cardinal with countable cofinality (am I using cofinal correctly? I mean it's a supremum of a countable number of sets in the sense of König's theorem)?
I can see now that can never be the cardinality of the continuum, but maybe it still makes sense to say something like ?
Cohen's forcing method to prove the independence of CH starts with some model , which has an idea of what it's cardinality of the continuum is, and then adds new reals to it, establishing a new model which has its own idea of the cardinality of the continuum . Due to the extension method I assumed that contains , and that can look at to compare it with it's own . I hope that this clears up what I meant by "inside" and "outside" (of ).
The reason I started talking about countable models is that it seems to me that in the "outside view" of a countable model , that is, from a model where we can see as countable, we should also be able to see that is countable, right?
I'm well aware that we can only ever say countably many things (in a somewhat unrelated fact even only finitely many) about any model of set theory, and that that is related to what we mean by countable model. I'm not an expert on this, but it seems that topos theory gives a nice avenue to make this precise. Maybe I should think about "smaller" models (in the , sense above) than the effective topos.
In any case, I am thankful for your discussions in this thread! It does give me a couple of starting points for continuing my quest, which should keep me busy for a while.
Also, hi @David Michael Roberts, nice to see you here! Yes, as you say, I should have written , and I should have known better. Thanks!
Re @John Baez: I did ask Scott on his blog just yesterday. I'm not sure if I'm happy with the way it came out, as I feel I could do much better now.
I am not quite convinced that it's a better place for this discussion, as he may not yet be ready to answer my question, and because he does not seem to be into topos theory, which I'd be happy to involve. Also, the crowd in the comment section over there may not compare with this terriffic forum of experts here.
In any case, as I mentioned earlier, I am just an amateur, so it's important to me that you nice people see some value in this thread, or even have fun pondering my question. I really wouldn't expect answers on a silver platter. Enjoy yourselves and Merry Christmas!
Refurio Anachro said:
I can see now that can never be the cardinality of the continuum, but maybe it still makes sense to say something like ?
If denotes the cardinality of an ordinal , then of course not, because is countable.
Nice hint, @Todd Trimble! It seems, I really don't understand what "countable model of ZFC" means. I'll see if I can look that up after having breakfast.
Well, it means countable from the point of view of the "meta-background". As near as I can tell, the usual maneuver of the traditional set theorist is to start with a countable transitive model M of ZFC and then produce a forcing extension M[G], all these constructions being small so that these are actual objects in the universe V that is the "real world" of sets that forms the backdrop. For a category theorist used to dealing with large categories, this feels sort of fussy and uptight. My gut inclination would be to say: don't worry much about countable models; they're a crutch.
Refurio Anachro said:
Nice hint, Todd Trimble! It seems, I really don't understand what "countable model of ZFC" means. I'll see if I can look that up after having breakfast.
To talk about a model of set theory you need to already be working within set theory, so we start with our universe of sets and the usual membership relation ; let's assume it obeys ZFC.
A model of set theory is then a collection of sets where and a relation called that we use to mean membership in the model even though it may not be the real .
We require that the sets in and the relation obey the ZF axioms (let's use those axioms).
So for example there must be an "empty set in the model". That's a set such that for no set do we have .
Note the careful distinction between and here!
does not need to equal the "real" empty set .
Okay, so that's a model of set theory in a nutshell! Ask questions if it's unclear!
Then it's really easy to say what's a countable model of set theory. It's a model such that is countable!
Yeah, it seems like a main problem you're having is mixing 'internal' and 'external' things together, and it's really important to not do that.
For instance, I think you mentioned the effective topos earlier. There the model is build so that everything is externally paired up with some method of computing it. Since there are only countably many 'programs', every set used in the model is externally countable. However, the diagonal argument is constructive, and can be used to show that e.g. is uncountable internally.
When you decode what the internal statement means externally, it is that the computable functions from to are "computably uncountable," meaning that for every computable enumeration , we can compute an element of that is not in the enumeration.
And of course, even though the external set theory thinks the set used for in the model is countable, the bijection exhibiting that is not computable.
Todd Trimble said:
My gut inclination would be to say: don't worry much about countable models; they're a crutch.
Absolutely. It's just so that the Rasiowa–Sikorski lemma can be applied so that a generic filter can be said to exist, which is equivalent to what is needed to pass from the category of double negation sheaves, via the filterquotient construction, to a well-pointed topos. If you don't care about that, and are happy with either boolean-valued models or internal logic, then countability is absolutely not needed.
Without countability it's a little more delicate.
Well if you want to prove independence from ETCS then you need well-pointedness no?
Thanks, @John Baez, this is indeed helpful. I'm still not quite convinced that I won't want to think about countability issues, but I'll take your suggestion into account @Todd Trimble. Thanks, @David Michael Roberts, I was just about to complain when I read your extra breadcrumbs. It made me reconsider what I might want with countability, and I'm now more confident that I won't have to look at this to follow you guys. Special thanks to @Dan Doel for keeping an eye on me.
Looking at what wikipedia has to say about forcing I slowly realize that Cohen's original 'inside' view is nowadays considered more difficult than an approach based off a backdrop set theory. Especially Dana Scott's boolean valued models. Well, yes, that makes my questions seem... a bit ill-informed. I still have the urge to look at this in a completely relative way, without any backdrop theory. Curious what MacLane and Moerdijk have to say about this. Hope I'll find the time to learn what's fussy and uptight about the set theory way of doing stuff.
Forcing seems much simpler now, and I think I should be able to construct an example like I've been asking for, even if that seems much more artificial than I had suspected earlier XD
David Michael Roberts said:
Todd Trimble said:
My gut inclination would be to say: don't worry much about countable models; they're a crutch.
Absolutely. It's just so that the Rasiowa–Sikorski lemma can be applied so that a generic filter can be said to exist, which is equivalent to what is needed to pass from the category of double negation sheaves, via the filterquotient construction, to a well-pointed topos. If you don't care about that, and are happy with either boolean-valued models or internal logic, then countability is absolutely not needed.
Without countability it's a little more delicate.
Thank you! I'll know whom to turn to if I have questions about forcing. When I first tried learning about forcing (the traditional way), I was mystified by the need to introduce Martin's axiom, but from the Wikipedia article, it seems to be to take care of the existence of the generic filter for uncountable models.
@David Michael Roberts But I have to say, the need to invoke things like Martin's axiom (which is independent of ZFC if I recall correctly) to construct generic filters in the case of uncountable models seems like a very poor advertisement for the traditional set-theoretic approach to forcing. In contrast, the topos-theoretic approach -- and let's say we satisfy the demand for two-valued models by passing to a filterquotient in the last step -- doesn't seem to involve any of this Martin's axiom stuff. So it seems that the topos-theoretic approach requires fewer extraneous assumptions! Is that right? If not, could you set me straight on this?
Hmm, to construct the filterquotient you still need some input, but maybe it's less than what the material version needs.
I don't see anything too technical. There is Proposition VI.1.6 from Mac Lane-Moerdijk which reads: let E be a Boolean topos and let U be a maximal filter of subobjects of 1 in E. Then the filter-quotient topos E/U is two-valued (and again Boolean). There is no indication that anything more is needed.
As far as I'm aware, you won't really need Martin's axiom, if you are working with countable models - Martin's axiom is needed to prove the existence of a filter intersecting a family of dense sets of cardinallity strictly between and , but, as your model is countable, it doesn't know any such family. Also, given that every model of ZFC has a forcing extension satisfying Martin's Axiom, I don't think there is any harm in assuming that the model you are starting with satisfies it. The advantage of Martin's axiom, on the other hand, is that its independence allows you to prove the independence (or, rather, consistency) of many other statements - it can, in some sense, be interpreted as saying that, in the absence of CH, the cardinals between and are almost as well-behaved as itself - otherwise, they can be incredibly wild - so it has a number of useful consequences.
Generally, as far as I understand, the topos theoretic way of doing forcing is quite nice for simple forcing, but we haven't yet figured out a good way to do iterated forcing with it, which is needed, sometimes (for example, to establish the consistency of . Also, as ZFC is not finitely axiomatisable, I don't think there is any nice characterisation of topoi that correspond to models of ZFC - one usually only gets a weaker set theory.
I thought I'd heard David Roberts had done some work on iterated forcing via topos theory, but obviously he should be the one to say. (Scedrov too? I don't recall exactly.)
There are ways to take into account replacement schema and so forth for toposes. Mike Shulman has developed much of this in the context of his stack semantics.
Forgot to ask: what do people do with ?
@Todd Trimble Do you mean or ? For the latter, I don't know if there is any good reason for it. The former, for example, proves that there is no Suslin line (i.e. it proves that the real numbers are the only complete, dense linear order without end points that has the countable chain conditions).
No, I meant the latter. What I meant to ask was: can it be forced?
I'd guess so? It is provable that the analogue of Martin's axiom is false for , so you'd probably want to force to be larger in a way that doesn't create too many new filters. Perhaps even the normal Cohen forcing might already do it.
Just searching a bit, this paper https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.jmsj/1499846513 at least shows that it is consistent. I haven't looked into it, yet, though.
Todd Trimble said:
Forgot to ask: what do people do with ?
I don't know anything about any of this, but the continuum hypothesis implies Martin's axiom, right? So is the same as , right?
Yes, Martin's axiom doesn't really say anything, if one assumes CH.
You seem to be right, John. Thanks.
I'd never looked into Martin's axiom until just now, but it's a funny axiom, since it says all those mysterious cardinals between and behave like in some respects. Sort of like an axiom saying that all the ghosts in my house eat the same thing for breakfast as me and my wife.
Yes. So to put your earlier remark in those terms: that's of course true if there are no ghosts in your house. :-)
Just now I'm reminded of a peculiar fact I learned some time back: ZF + GCH implies the axiom of choice. I don't exactly know why I'm bringing this up; just some of the fun and games to be had with Hartogs numbers.
Huh, I didn't know that!
Yes, I believe Martin's axiom, and I believe all the ghosts in my house eat oatmeal for breakfast just like Lisa and me.
Todd Trimble said:
I thought I'd heard David Roberts had done some work on iterated forcing via topos theory, but obviously he should be the one to say. (Scedrov too? I don't recall exactly.)
Definitely Ščedrov, I just picked up that one can do many instances of proper class forcing this way, too (and despite one claim I made, not all instances)
There is no indication that anything more is needed.
Thanks for checking, @Todd Trimble . I'm on holidays without the usual resources to hand and was not in a position to dig them out. At one point I thought about what the 'generic' is, in the setting of material set theory, from the point of view of the double-negation sheaves, but I've forgotten,
John Baez said:
(Btw, I had dinner at Charles Fourman's house at CT2019 - he lives in Edinburgh, and he's a well-established computer scientist now. I wish I'd asked him about this stuff - mainly, what it felt like to work on that project.)
John, I think you mean Mike Fourman, if you mean the guy who did his PhD with Dana Scott
https://www.inf.ed.ac.uk/people/staff/Michael_Fourman.html (Mike is an old friend)
John Baez said:
Well, in the models where CH fails there are cardinals between and . Let's not deny that.
Right, Wikipedia has a very pretty picture of some of the "intuitive" cardinalities here https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cicho%C5%84%27s_diagram
Valeria de Paiva said:
John Baez said:
(Btw, I had dinner at Charles Fourman's house at CT2019 - he lives in Edinburgh, and he's a well-established computer scientist now. I wish I'd asked him about this stuff - mainly, what it felt like to work on that project.)
John, I think you mean Mike Fourman, if you mean the guy who did his PhD with Dana Scott
https://www.inf.ed.ac.uk/people/staff/Michael_Fourman.html (Mike is an old friend)
Oh, wrong Fourman. Whoops! Thanks.
Two Fourmans make an Eightman.
Valeria de Paiva said:
John Baez said:
Well, in the models where CH fails there are cardinals between and . Let's not deny that.
Right, Wikipedia has a very pretty picture of some of the "intuitive" cardinalities here https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cicho%C5%84%27s_diagram
By the way - I never said that. But I could have said it, because I would never want to deny that in models where CH fails, CH fails.
Is Martin's axiom compatible with lots of space before the continuum, e.g. ?
John Baez said:
Valeria de Paiva said:
John Baez said:
Well, in the models where CH fails there are cardinals between and . Let's not deny that.
Right, Wikipedia has a very pretty picture of some of the "intuitive" cardinalities here https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cicho%C5%84%27s_diagram
By the way - I never said that. But I could have said it, because I would never want to deny that in models where CH fails, CH fails.
John, what do you mean you never said that? you did, I was only replying to a specific sentence of yours on the 27 Dec? just a bit earlier in this thread, I think. I sometimes spend 4/5 days without logging on to zulip and there's lots to read, but I was only replying to what I thought was the implied question: which are these middle cardinalities that exist if CH fails? JohnBaez27Dec.png
which are these middle cardinalities
Heh, that's why I started this thread! Well, I made some weird typos, and I think one of them prompted John's statement you quoted. Which didn't stop me from doing it again %-D
Anyways, I read John's answer such that he did not say anything about Cichoń's diagram, which he could have (I know he's heard of it), but that that wouldn't have helped the confusion, of which I had plenty. Which can be contagious. Which it hadn't been in this case. Yet...
Oh, wow, I did say that. Sorry. I looked back to see where I said it, but I didn't look back far enough - I was only examining my recent remarks. By the way, if you use the "quote" feature on Zulip your quote will contain a link to the original remark. Like this:
John Baez said:
Well, in the models where CH fails there are cardinals between and . Let's not deny that.
By the way, I was not offended, just puzzled. I couldn't figure out why I would say this as part of the recent conversation about Martin's axiom.
yeah, I have not learned how to use quote features in any of the platforms. I thought I was using it.
here it doesn't bother me much. but on whatsapp, it's a problem.
To quote a comment, add an emoticon to it, or do all sorts of other wonderful things, I just move my mouse to the right end of your comment and click on the little options that appear.
For example I just added the :cry: emoticon.
It's possible you quoted my message but then deleted the stuff that creates a link back.
This stuff:
@_**John Baez|275920** [said](https://categorytheory.zulipchat.com/#narrow/stream/266967-general.3A-mathematics/topic/Forcing.3A.20cardinals.20below.20c/near/221315962):
creates the link back:
John Baez said:
On my screen, Valeria's messages correctly quote yours, John. Perhaps there's some issue with Zulip.
Oh wow, it does. I'm doubly sorry.
The android app doesn't seem to support quoting :scream:
Refurio Anachro said:
Is Martin's axiom compatible with lots of space before the continuum, e.g. ?
If inaccessible cardinals are consistent, you can even have .
Refurio, if you haven't already, look up Easton's theorem. Prepare to have your mind blown. If your mind isn't blown, you might not have appreciated Easton's theorem. :-)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Easton%27s_theorem
Easton's theorem
Which says that the only constraints on powersets are the theorems by Cantor (powersets are strictly larger), and König (it mustn't be the supremum of a countable set of cardinals). Under ZFC, as AC doesn't add any further constraints. Yes, that's rather extreme. I knew the fact, but not that it's due to Easton. Thanks for that, @Todd Trimble! And Solovay's earlier result says the same, but only for ?
The thing with MA is that it's supposed to contain that mess somewhat. Which it... I suppose it does!!?! And it felt so reasonable, that it's effect would be to make all cardinals less than kind of countable.
Blowing one's mind. That detonantion metaphor seems way too harmless.
But it's not just one single infinite power set cardinality that can be manipulated according to these constraints. It's all of them, simultaneously. See the statement "if is a class function..."
Umm... "a proper class of forcing conditions"! /me squints eyes
So G just has to shift cardinalities! It could be larger than the powerset operation (say, the ε map), but it could also be smaller, since CH does not hold.
That's gross! ZFC is a joke! I'm starting to feel why Woodin might have changed his mind to argue for CH!
The Continuum Hypothesis and the search for Mathematical Infinity, W. Hugh Woodin - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nVF4N1Ix5WI
Refurio Anachro said:
That's gross! ZFC is a joke!
I think one reasonable attitude is to treat "a model of ZFC" as a bit like "a model of the theory of groups". We don't expect the axioms for a group to uniquely pin down a specific group... so we're not shocked that there are lots of very different groups. Similarly there are lots of very different models of ZFC. The problem is that we were raised to talk about "the" universe of sets, not "a" universe of sets.
Refurio Anachro said:
Umm... "a proper class of forcing conditions"! /me squints eyes
So G just has to shift cardinalities! It could be larger than the powerset operation (say, the ε map), but it could also be smaller, since CH does not hold.
That's gross! ZFC is a joke! I'm starting to feel why Woodin might have changed his mind to argue for CH!
The Continuum Hypothesis and the search for Mathematical Infinity, W. Hugh Woodin - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nVF4N1Ix5WI
I don't think you said that right. Here is supposed to be a possible power set operation. Easton says that one can force to occur for all infinite cardinals provided that satisfies these conditions: implies and and equals its own cofinality. (The first two conditions are necessary conditions. The last isn't, but it's what Easton assumed to prove his theorem. Weakenings of the last condition are not too well understood, but there has been some progress since Easton.)
What gets me is that you can have things like : that the power set operations need not be injective! But of course it has to be monotone, and satisfy the cofinality condition mandated by König's theorem.
So when it does not contradict Cantor's theorem that when we also have , because we had skipped that. Nifty!
No, I had some strange ideas about other functions and I cannot remember what they might have been. It was late for me, and that Wikipedia entry is a bit spartanic, too.
But I'd like to stick with my appallment, even if only for the sake of this discussion. ZFC introduces all those new objects, demanding a rather excessive ontology for them, and then pretty much completely fails to pin down their meaning with respect to the powerset operation, a basic tool of set theory! Admitted, that operation is what prompted Cantor to start introducing all those sets...
Well, that's a good remark: we have here a death blow to a type of Platonic dream that there's a truth of the matter "out there" and it's up to us to find it. Joel David Hamkins has been writing and theorizing about the set-theoretic multiverse, and I think topos theory also encourages the outlook that there's not a single hegemonic monolithic foundations, but a network of different possible worlds of mathematics.
Every time I hear various philosophers or foundationalists banging on about ontology and ontological commitment and so forth, I get a little nervous, as if someone is trying to sell me a set-theoretic bill of goods. For example, I hear various people trying to explain that ETCS has a "weak ontology". I struggle to understand exactly what they mean by that.
I seem to have much less trouble accepting large ordinals, but I'm sure you could just as easily mention a breadcrumb that would nuke that conception of mine.
What was that somewhat popular alternative, weaker set theory again, where we don't need cardinals beyond . Was it Kripke-Platek set theory? I remember that KP's consistency strength is the Feferman-Schütte's ordinal (I once wrote a post about this on g+), but that's still countable, so it might be. Or was it an even weaker theory? I tried to find a reference, but it's eluding me :S
If you're appalled by the fact doesn't pin down the cardinality of , just assume the generalized continuum hypothesis! It's sort of like: if you're appalled by nonabelian groups, assume your group is abelian. :upside_down:
Personally - since I'm not really a set theorist - I'd be happy to use ZF + V = L. A bunch of set theorists object to it:
Although the axiom of constructibility does resolve many set-theoretic questions, it is not typically accepted as an axiom for set theory in the same way as the ZFC axioms. Among set theorists of a realist bent, who believe that the axiom of constructibility is either true or false, most believe that it is false. This is in part because it seems unnecessarily "restrictive", as it allows only certain subsets of a given set, with no clear reason to believe that these are all of them. In part it is because the axiom is contradicted by sufficiently strong large cardinal axioms.
But these objections seem unconvincing to me. I sort of like the idea of working in a universe where you have more of a handle on what's there, so it doesn't seem "unnecessarily restrictive" to assume the only subsets are the constructible ones.
But I'm not an expert, so maybe an expert could convince me I have bad taste.
Todd wrote:
For example, I hear various people trying to explain that ETCS has a "weak ontology". I struggle to understand exactly what they mean by that.
Maybe they're trying to say "There are more things in heaven and Earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy". :upside_down:
Just for the record, I actually like Hamkin's approach a lot, and usually I'd feast on philosophers struggling with the ontology of set theory, especially when they've been ignorant of it }:->
But I also feel it's my duty to have a good intuition about these things, to earn my right to troll about that stuff. So I keep coming back to the platonic way of looking at it, even if ETCS seems very satisfying, especially from an operational (or computational) point of view.
ZFC doesn't really introduce this hierarchy. Set theorists do, no?
I think V=L is lacking some cardinals useful in model theory, it limits our ability to measure consistency strength in some important or interesting cases. Model theorists seem to love GCH, though.
Also, every proof theoretic ordinal is countable (and less than , I think).
John Baez said:
Todd wrote:
For example, I hear various people trying to explain that ETCS has a "weak ontology". I struggle to understand exactly what they mean by that.
Maybe they're trying to say "There are more things in heaven and Earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy". :upside_down:
I have a feeling they're trying to say something else. Something along the lines that ZFC in conjunction with the idea of the cumulative hierarchy gives a satisfying intuition for what sets are, and that ETCS looks more like just some jumble of axioms without a coherent underlying intuition for what's behind them. There's an idea that the cumulative hierarchy is recursively germinated from something small: for example, the hereditarily finite sets germinate just from the empty set. It's that recursive generation which imparts a feeling of a robust ontology. Or something like that.
(To Dan Doel: yes, of course.)
That seems meaningful, Dan Doel. I suppose I got that backwards, then. These larger things aren't needed to measure things, but to construct them? Sorry, I keep ending up fumbling.
I don't think you have to worry about fumbling, Refurio. We're just chatting informally. At least, I hope we are.
Refurio Anachro said:
But I also feel it's my duty to have a good intuition about these things, to earn my right to troll about that stuff. So I keep coming back to the platonic way of looking at it, even if ETCS seems very satisfying, especially from an operational (or computational) point of view.
I don't think "platonism" per se gives one much intuition about set theory. I think different set theorists have different intuitions about what sort of universe of sets they'd like - or phrased more platonically, what the universe of sets "is like". It would take a lot of work to get these intuitions, and it would be really interesting. I just find it tiresome when the conversation is phrased in terms of which intuition is "correct", in cases where two different intuitions lead to two different theories that could both be consistent.
There's one intuition that seems to say "anything not forbidden should be allowed". This pushes for bigger and bigger large cardinals, etc. That's certainly fun to explore.
kind of doesn't seem that weird to me, but then I'm used to cardinalities not being a total order. :smile:
I guess I should say rather than .
Platonism is just an excuse to evoke a peculiar kind of existential angst to get in touch, with set theory concepts in particular, in a performance art kind of meditation move, @John Baez. It's just a trick. If someone would press me to choose, I'd go for the larger universe. I'm not sure if that'd be the most helpful thing to do, as a backdrop to better understand what we're doing, or to explore the boundaries of our feeble not-even-countable understanding of maths.
I guess I should say rather than .
Good idea, @Dan Doel, and now I know how to it. Thanks!
Refurio Anachro said:
Platonism is just an excuse to evoke a peculiar kind of existential angst to get in touch, with set theory concepts in particular, in a performance art kind of meditation move, John Baez. It's just a trick.
Okay, I don't mind "platonism as trick for evoking existential angst".
If someone would press me to choose, I'd go for the larger universe.
I'd like to know enough about set theory to appreciate the intuitions of the experts... like why Woodin wants the axiom "V = ultimate L":
I doubt I could ever be convinced that these intuitions are "true" in some absolute sense, but perhaps someday I could understand why they're appealing.
In what sense could some systems be more true than others? Contradictions are clearly bad. Systems too small to contain popular, or interesting maths would surely be out, too. But what counts as interesting? Gödel's incompleteness result suggests, that we'd never be able to find a formalism to encompass everything. At least as long as we only consider consistent or countably generated systems...
Yes, I'd be curious to learn about such intuitions, too! I have occasionally tried to follow Woodin, but only with very limited success. Then there is this conundrum of identifying the standard counting numbers. Maybe that's less mysterious than I think, but I'm certainly not done digesting Nelson's work about this. People must have different approaches and values, right?
Refurio Anachro said:
In what sense could some systems be more true than others?
I don't know! But people like Woodin seem to have some intuitions about set theory, going beyond the axioms, that make them feel some axioms are "true" and others not.
Have you ever read this?
It has a lot of nice history, and isolates some of the intuitions that set theorists use to say what's "true". For example:
The second powerful rule of thumb sometimes cited in support of inaccessibles is reflection: the universe of sets is so complex that it cannot be completely described; therefore, anything true of the entire universe must already be true of some initial segment of the universe.
People must have different approaches and values, right?
Yes, definitely they disagree.
I have occasionally tried to follow Woodin, but only with very limited success.
Yeah, I don't understand his work at all. It's pretty low-priority for me, too. It just intrigues me that there's a guy like this who seems to have some intuition about the universe of sets that motivates him to prove lots of big theorems....
As far as I recall, Hamkins' (and others) look at the multiverse from the point of view of set forcing models, but not (yet) from class forcing models. Happy to be corrected.
I'd be careful about saying that the cardinality of every power set can be manipulated, because I think the power set of the natural numbers can be singular, just not with countable cofinality. And Easton's theorem only says that regular cardinals can be adjusted as desired, subject to the two mild constraints coming from Cantor and König. The singular cardinals are much weirder and harder to understand.
@David Michael Roberts Oh, you're right that I misread the statement from the Wikipedia article. This is embarrassing, as I'm pretty sure I'd gotten this right in the past.