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I know I've seen a there is a theorem that states that, unlike intuitionistic propositional logic (IPL) where any cartesian closed category gives a model, if you try to define the structure on a category to interpret classical propositional logic (CPL) then you can show that the only models are preorders. This gives a precise sense in which (CPL) cannot be given the same kind of constructive interpretation as IPL and we have to change something to get a computational interpretation of classical logic (linearity, evaluation order, etc).
But I'm not having any luck finding a reference. Does anyone have a good one?
The only precise formulation I can remember is that if something is a biCCC then it has a strict initial object (Any A -> 0 is an isomorphism) and so with classical logic the opposite category should also be a biCCC and so a model of classical logic would have a strict terminal object (Any 1 -> A is an isomorphism) which would for example make inl(): 1 + 1
and inr(): 1 + 1
equal.
try Lambek and Scott, Prop 8.3
It was originally observed by Joyal, and is Thm 2.3 here: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/1439/1/streicherreus1998.pdf, and also in Lambek & Scott
Thanks both, I think these were exactly the 2 theorems I had in mind. For posterity, it's Prop 8.3 in part I of Lambek & Scott (page 67 in my copy)
The lemma from Joyal is also mentioned on the nlab here: https://ncatlab.org/nlab/show/dualizing+object+in+a+closed+category
The Streicher-Reus paper is a bit confusing to me. It looks like the object they write as is only the initial object of if is the domain with one element, in which case is the terminal category? So it seems misleading of them to say that the only problem with interpreting classical logic as a category is that is only logically equivalent rather than isomorphic to . And also I don't think there's coproducts on this category so it interprets only a fragment of classical propositional logic.
I wonder: are there any non-trivial biCCCs where and are logically equivalent for all ?
oh yes even Finite sets satisfy this
but the is not natural hm
They write for the initial object of (def 2.3, for any ). Another way of thinking about this is that it's isomorphic to the dual of the Kleisli category of the continuation monad .
The definition of is , and so a morphism out of is which is equivalent to . This is a weakly initial object because you always have the projection morphism, but it will only be unique if is the terminal domain , in which case the category is trivial.
I see, but if you used , you'd get a . The is not really necessary though, since they could use (remark 2.2).