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Let be a functor, with for some object and some object . Assume that there is a different from with in .
I'm wondering if we can modify to get a new functor so that . I want to require that for all . I'm curious if it's possible to do this so that and are naturally isomorphic.
To do this, we have to figure out how acts on morphisms that go to or from . If is a morphism from to , then and . We have a triangular diagram formed by these morphisms and the isomorphism . It's tempting to set so that this diagram commutes, so .
Similarly, if is a morphism to from , then and . We again have a triangular diagram formed by these morphisms and the isomorphism . In this case, I want to set , so the diagram commutes.
Finally, if is a morphism from to , then and . Using the isomorphism , we get a square diagram that we would like to commute, so that , implying that .
The next order of business would be to check that is actually a functor. There are bunch of cases to check, when investigating whether for composable morphisms and in . For example, the easiest case is when neither nor go to or from , and in this case we can use the fact that is a functor to show . However, there are a lot more cases to check depending on whether or or both go to and/or from !
Does really form a functor? And is there some way to find this out without checking a bunch of cases (I'm currently counting 9 cases to check)? Finally, if does form a functor, is it naturally isomorphic to ?
Yes, this works! Note that your and the natural isomorphism depend on the chosen isomorphism .
More generally, given an arbitrary family of isomorphisms , there is a unique way of making into a functor so that the maps define a natural isomorphism .
So one can arbitrarily tweak the values of a functor within isomorphism and get a naturally isomorphic functor.
David Egolf said:
Let be a functor, with for some object and some object . Assume that there is a different from with in .
I'm wondering if we can modify to get a new functor so that . I want to require that for all . I'm curious if it's possible to do this so that and are naturally isomorphic.
Yes, you can. I didn't look carefully at your approach, since it's less work to say what I'd do - you can tell me if that's what you were doing. The basic idea is to take and tweak it minimally to achieve the desired effect.
So, on objects, let except for one thing: make . On morphisms you need to do a bit more work since whenever sent a morphism to one with source or target (or both) equal to , you need to send it to one where the source or target is . To make sure is a functor you had better not do this in a random way! You'd better choose an isomorphism and use this and its inverse to "reroute" morphisms that start or end in . That is:
And yes, there had better be some more intelligent way to say all this, check that is a functor, and check that is naturally isomorphic to !
The basic principle here is that "a chosen isomorphism is as good as equality".
One reason I've never thought about how to do the above process intelligently is that I've never needed to make sure a functor doesn't hit some particular object. And it's not like I ever say "ooh, that object is disgusting, I'm going to make sure my functor avoids it". :upside_down:
But it's nice to know we could do it if we had to. Like if Elon Musk starting charging us a fee each time we used , we could switch to using some other 3-dimensional real vector space.
John Baez said:
Yes, you can. I didn't look carefully at your approach, since it's less work to say what I'd do - you can tell me if that's what you were doing.
I believe your approach is the same as the one I described above. So that's encouraging!
Figuring out how to check that the approach works without a lot of tedious work still interests me. I've been thinking about the process of moving "structure" or "properties" between isomorphic objects a little bit the last few days. I'm interested in understanding when statements about one object can be transformed into statements about an isomorphic object, especially when these statements involve interactions with other categories. I'm also interested in understanding if there is some process that can take a property that doesn't "transform" properly between isomorphic objects, and extends it to one that does.
By the way, these musings are inspired by the earlier discussion on essential fibers, which I think is like an upgraded version of "fiber" that doesn't change in an undesired way as we move between isomorphic objects.
I'm interested in understanding when statements about one object can be transformed into statements about an isomorphic object.
The short answer is: "always".
However, making sure the answer is "always" requires that we doing things right, like using essential fibers instead of fibers, etc. Any construction that goes wrong - that makes it impossible to replace an object by an isomorphic object - is said to violate the [[principle of equivalence]], and we avoid it. For short, we say it is "evil".
One main advantage of modern foundations of mathematics, like homotopy type theory / univalent mathematics, is that it becomes essentially impossible to formulate constructions that violate the principle of equivalence.
As you'll see at the link, Michael Makkai proposed the Principle of Isomorphism:
“all grammatically correct properties of objects of a fixed category are to be invariant under isomorphism”.
The principle of equivalence is a generalization of this.
But you and I have been doing category theory the old way, where there aren't built-in guardrails, and it's up to the user to use only constructions that don't violate the principle of equivalence.
David Egolf said:
Figuring out how to check that the approach works without a lot of tedious work still interests me.
Yes, there should be something better than what I said. Here's something I tried but discarded, still perhaps worth thinking about. Forget the functor for a minute and think about the category .
If and are objects of for which there's an isomorphism , I claim there's a functor
that
1) is the identity on all objects except perhaps ,
2) has ,
3) is naturally isomorphic to , via some natural isomorphism with
Then, given any functor , the functor has these properties:
A) Whenever , ,
B) is naturally isomorphic to .
Item B) follows from item 3) and a bit of category theory that you might enjoy learning!
Even in old-fashioned mathematics, there are abstract notions that characterize "transportable" structure and properties, and general theorems about them. For instance, a (usually forgetful) functor is called an isofibration if for any object and isomorphism in , there exists an object such that and an isomorphism in such that .
This includes your example of functors: let be your category of functors , and the category of families of objects of indexed by the set of objects of , and let forget the action of a functor on morphisms but remember its action on objects. Then what you want is the fact that is an isofibration: given any functor , and for each object an object and an isomorphism (this is the isomorphism ), there exists a functor with this action on objects and a natural isomorphism (this is the isomorphism ).
Of course, one still has to prove that this functor is an isofibration. It's instructive to do this by hand, as the others in this thread have done; but once you get familiar with this sort of stuff there are general theorems you can appeal to. For instance, this functor happens to be (strictly) monadic, and any (strictly) monadic functor is an isofibration.
John Baez said:
Any construction that goes wrong - that makes it impossible to replace an object by an isomorphic object - is said to violate the [[principle of equivalence]], and we avoid it. For short, we say it is "evil".
I was about to mention that there are some interesting "evil" categorical gadgets, like [[dagger categories]], but apparently the equivalence elves have been working on that particular example, so there is now a non-"evil" formulation for the dagger. I guess the moral of the story is that if something "evil" is useful enough, it can (always?) find "salvation" with an appropriate change in perspective.
Thank-you everyone for your interesting responses! I will plan to read them properly and respond once I can (unfortunately today I have a nasty headache!).
John Baez said:
As you'll see at the link, Michael Makkai proposed the Principle of Isomorphism:
“all grammatically correct properties of objects of a fixed category are to be invariant under isomorphism”.
This is thought provoking for me. Without having thought deeply about any of this, I would have expected that we would instead want the properties of isomorphic objects to be invariant "up to isomorphism", not completely invariant. So, if then for any property . We would need a category that the property values live in as objects though, for us to assess when two property values are isomorphic.
I would probably need to read the original context to better understand what Makkai meant.
John Baez said:
Then, given any functor , the functor has these properties:
A) Whenever , ,
B) is naturally isomorphic to .Item B) follows from item 3) and a bit of category theory that you might enjoy learning!
If I understand, the "bit of category theory" being referred to would involve showing the following:
Hmm. Let me see if I can prove this.
I think I got it! In sketch form:
I suppose it could still be a lot of work to show that there is a that satisfies properties (1), (2) and (3), though.
David Egolf said:
John Baez said:
As you'll see at the link, Michael Makkai proposed the Principle of Isomorphism:
“all grammatically correct properties of objects of a fixed category are to be invariant under isomorphism”.
This is thought provoking for me. Without having thought deeply about any of this, I would have expected that we would instead want the properties of isomorphic objects to be invariant "up to isomorphism", not completely invariant. So, if then for any property . We would need a category that the property values live in as objects though, for us to assess when two property values are isomorphic.
Right. Ordinarily when people say "property" they mean something that can be true or false, so that takes values in the 2-element poset . This poset has only identity morphisms, so two properties are isomorphic iff they are equal.
That's in classical logic. In intuitionistic logic, which Makkai is deeply familiar with, we often replace the 2-element poset by a more general poset of truth values. But since it's a poset, properties values in this will still be isomorphic iff they are equal.
I imagine this might be what Makkai meant when he required properties to be invariant under isomorphism.
A more modern attitude, which Makkai understood long before most, would be that for things valued in a category, "invariant" means "invariant up to coherent isomorphism". And more generally, for things valued in an n-category, "invariant" means "invariant up to coherent equivalence".
(I could explain "coherent" but I don't feel like it right this second.)
Still, it would be a bit unusual to use the word "property" to mean something valued in a category or n-category that's not just a poset (or preorder).
"Property" is basically the same as "predicate", to hark back to an earlier conversation.
David Egolf said:
If I understand, the "bit of category theory" being referred to would involve showing the following:
- if a functor satisfies ,
- then for any functor , we have
Exactly.
David Egolf said:
I think I got it!
I think you did! And in the process you've started learning about "whiskering".
Given a functor and functors and a natural transformation , there is a natural transformation called left whiskered by , and sometimes written , which does this:
There is also "right whiskering", and these operations satisfy a bunch of nice rules.
Using these rules you can easily show that if has an inverse (so it's a natural isomorphism) then has an inverse, namely .
You can also see this directly, and it sounds like you already have.
John Baez said:
Still, it would be a bit unusual to use the word "property" to mean something valued in a category or n-category that's not just a poset (or preorder).
I guess I still have essential fibers on my mind here. I would be tempted to use the word "property" to refer to the essential fiber of an object with respect to a given functor ("a property of this object is its essential fiber with respect to this functor"). But an essential fiber is a category, which doesn't necessarily live in a preorder or partial order, so it sounds like "property" probably isn't the word I'm looking for here.
Hmm. Maybe even in this example there is a property like "induces this specific category as an essential fiber", which would lead to a statement about the object that can be true or false. Maybe I'm looking for a phrase like "induced structure" instead of "property", to refer to the essential fiber.
John Baez said:
... left whiskered by ...
I think this should this be whiskered by ; the functors are the "whiskers" because they are one-dimensional.
Discussion of right vs left is an invitation to argument, but in "Invitation to Higher Gauge Theory" you called this a right whiskering (I guess to agree with applicative notation ). I'd prefer to stick with diagrammatic notation (e.g., ), and call it a left whiskering of by .
David Egolf said:
I would be tempted to use the word "property" to refer to the essential fiber of an object with respect to a given functor ("a property of this object is its essential fiber with respect to this functor").
Don't. Just say no.
For example, suppose you have the forgetful functor from groups to sets. Then you'd be calling a group a "property of" its underlying set. That's just not how we mathematicians talk. We'd call the group a structure on its underlying set.
Someday you'll learn about how forgetful functors can forget stuff, or just structure, or just properties. When this sinks in it really clarifies a lot about mathematics.
Briefly: properties take values in {T,F}. Structures take values in a set. Stuff takes values in a category. 2-stuff takes values in a 2-category. Etc.
In our earlier conversation, we saw that the homotopy fiber of a functor between categories is a category, in general. So we say that in a general a functor forgets stuff. But we came up with conditions under which the homotopy fiber is just a set - or more precisely, equivalent to the discrete category on a set. If all the homotopy fibers are just sets, it makes sense to say our functor is just forgetting structure.
If we look at, say, the forgetful functor from abelian groups to groups, the homotopy fibers are all sets with either 0 or 1 elements, depending on whether our group is abelian or not. So in this case our functor is just forgetting a property: the property of being abelian.
Spencer Breiner said:
John Baez said:
... left whiskered by ...
I think this should this be whiskered by ; the functors are the "whiskers" because they are one-dimensional.
You're right! I got mixed up. For the non-expert: when you draw this sort of thing as a diagram, the natural transformation looks like a mouth, and looks like a whisker poking out. If you have it looks like a mouth with a whisker poking out to the right... at least in one convention for drawing these things. Then this is "right whiskering". If you draw it the other way then it's called "left whiskering".
Here I hadn't mixed up left and right; I'd mixed up whiskers and mouths, which is much worse.
Discussion of right vs left is an invitation to argument, but in "Invitation to Higher Gauge Theory" you called this a right whiskering (I guess to agree with applicative notation ).
I'm glad someone is keeping track of these things. I don't really care much what's left and what's right, though in any given text I try to be consistent (and often fail).
Mike Shulman said:
Even in old-fashioned mathematics, there are abstract notions that characterize "transportable" structure and properties, and general theorems about them. For instance, a (usually forgetful) functor is called an isofibration if for any object and isomorphism in , there exists an object such that and an isomorphism in such that .
This includes your example of functors: let be your category of functors , and the category of families of objects of indexed by the set of objects of , and let forget the action of a functor on morphisms but remember its action on objects. Then what you want is the fact that is an isofibration: given any functor , and for each object an object and an isomorphism (this is the isomorphism ), there exists a functor with this action on objects and a natural isomorphism (this is the isomorphism ).
Thanks for introducing me to the concept of "isofibration"!
I don't yet understand your second paragraph, though. In the category , what are the objects, and what are the morphisms? My first guess from your description is that an object is a function to the objects of from the objects of , and that a morphism is a function between objects of that makes the resulting triangular diagram commute. However, I'm unsure if this is correct - I'm still learning the terminology involved here.
An object of is a function from the objects of to the objects of , and a morphism from to is a function sending each to a morphism in .
There are two ways to see this as an instance of something more general. First, it is actually the ordinary functor category from , regarded as a discrete category, to . Second, it is the product (in Cat) of copies of the category .
Awesome, that makes a lot of sense! Thanks for explaining.
This is another nice example of how category theorists freely think of sets as their corresponding discrete categories (we also saw that in the homotopy fiber story). The exponential of sets and the exponential of a category by a set become commonly used special cases of the exponential of categories .
I see! So for sets and can be viewed as the set of functions from to , but it can also be thought of as a category of functors between discrete categories. The objects are functors - which are just functions - and the morphisms are natural transformations, which are sort of "translations" between functions. One cool thing this approach enables: we get a notion of "isomorphic functions" for functions from to . That is, we can say two functions are isomorphic if they are naturally isomorphic when viewed as functors between discrete categories.
I think I'd thought about this example before, but not the case where one of the two categories in the exponential is discrete and the other isn't necessarily discrete. Very interesting to learn about!
That is, we can say two functions are isomorphic if they are naturally isomorphic when viewed as functors between discrete categories.
Yes, good point! But when exactly are two functions naturally isomorphic according to this definition? There's a very simple criterion.
Oh, I think they are naturally isomorphic exactly when they are equal. If as functors between discrete categories, then for any morphism in we have . But the only morphisms in the target category are identity morphisms, so . So if , then .
Right! Moral: when working with categories that are secretly just sets, "isomorphic" secretly just means "equal".
Oh, I think the functor category is actually a discrete category when and are discrete categories: the only morphisms are identity morphisms. It makes sense, then, that it can be reasonably viewed as a set!
Mike Shulman said:
This includes your example of functors: let be your category of functors , and the category of families of objects of indexed by the set of objects of , and let forget the action of a functor on morphisms but remember its action on objects. Then what you want is the fact that is an isofibration: given any functor , and for each object an object and an isomorphism (this is the isomorphism ), there exists a functor with this action on objects and a natural isomorphism (this is the isomorphism ).
I think I understand the idea of this now! Let be a functor that sends an object to . Let be the corresponding functor from to , that remembers only how maps on objects. Now let be a modified version of , that instead maps to some , with .
I think in . That hopefully isn't too hard to show, since we've forgotten about the morphisms in for the moment. Then, if is an isofibration, since is an object in the image of and , that means that there is some so that . Further, this is isomorphic to in .
I'd have to check the details still to make sure I didn't make a mistake, but I suspect this is the basic idea!
David Egolf said:
Oh, I think the functor category is actually a discrete category when and are discrete categories: the only morphisms are identity morphisms. It makes sense, then, that it can be reasonably viewed as a set!
True! In fact is a discrete category whenever is discrete; there's no need for to be discrete. After all, a morphism in is a natural transformation between functors , and such a natural transformation must be the identity if has only identity morphisms.
You may have noticed here that I mentioned 3 cases but not the 4th:
John Baez said:
This is another nice example of how category theorists freely think of sets as their corresponding discrete categories (we also saw that in the homotopy fiber story). The exponential of sets and the exponential of a category by a set become commonly used special cases of the exponential of categories .
Raising a set to the power of a category gives a set, by what I just pointed out... but this case seems less useful than the other 3.