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Let be a functor, and let be the smallest subcategory of that contains .
I think we can view as "information about observed by through ". From this perspective some functors will be more informative than others, I think. For example, if is a proper subcategory of , we might say that is a less informative observation of in . Perhaps similarly, we might say that is no more informative than if there is a functor so that .
Consider now the collection of all subcategories of of the form for some functor . Does this collection have some natural kind of structure (perhaps ordered with respect to "informativeness")? Intuitively it feels like it should reflect in some way the structure of the subobjects of .
If is any subcategory of , there is a functor that is the identity on objects of and morphisms of : this is usually called "the inclusion of in ".
Note that , i.e. is the smallest subcategory of that contains ().
So when you say
Consider now the collection of all subcategories of of the form for some functor .
this is equivalent to saying "consider now the collection of all subcategories of ". I think this is a simpler way to think about things.
Does this collection have some natural kind of structure (perhaps ordered with respect to "informativeness")?
It is partially ordered by inclusion: that is, we can say if every object (resp. morphism) of is an object (resp. morphism) of , and this relation is a partial order.
Thanks @John Baez for your thoughts above. It makes sense that the subcategories of are ordered by inclusion.
However, I am actually primarily interested in the case where is fixed (maybe I didn't convey that very clearly, though). Then, it often isn't the case that we can express any subcategory of as the smallest subcategory containing the image of some functor mapping from .
For example, consider two sets and as discrete categories, with a functor being a function between them. Then if has fewer elements than , then we can't express every subcategory (subset) of as the image of some function .
I suppose, however, that the resulting subcategories are still ordered by inclusion.
It can also be interesting to think about what happens as varies, but is held fixed. For example, consider the case where and are sets viewed as discrete categories, and has a single element. Then we only have one functor from to - the functor that sends everything to a single object. The fact that this image subcategory of exists tells us that has at least one element, but not anything more. If has two elements, then functors into can start to detect a bit more about . Although, it is interesting to note here that not all functors from in this case are equally informative. I suppose an ordering on these can be inherited from the ordering by inclusion of the subcategories they induce.
For context, I was learning a bit about reflective subcategories. The "reflection" in a subcategory of an object I think corresponds to the one that detects as much as possible in that subcategory about the object being reflected.
This is the diagram I have in mind motivating this line of thought, although the notation used here annoyingly swaps and compared to what I said above:
reflection
(image from "Abstract and Concrete Categories", here is a subcategory of , also is an object of and an object of )
David Egolf said:
Thanks John Baez for your thoughts above. It makes sense that the subcategories of are ordered by inclusion. However, I am actually primarily interested in the case where is fixed (maybe I didn't convey that very clearly, though).
Oh, wow! Okay, that's more subtle.
Although, it is interesting to note here that not all functors from in this case are equally informative.
I wish you'd give a formal definition of what you mean here by "equally informative". Maybe you have some intuition for it but are still struggling to formalize it. But it's a bit hard for mathematicians to help until you do.
Here's a simple and interesting case to think about.
Suppose is the category whose objects are natural numbers, with a single morphism from to if and none otherwise. Category theorists might draw this as
Then taking , there are infinitely many functors with different images. You can probably think of infinitely many rather quickly. But in fact there are uncountably many, so maybe it's a fun puzzle to see why.
Or, maybe you'll decide that this infinite stuff is not at all what you're interested in!
John Baez said:
I wish you'd give a formal definition of what you mean here by "equally informative". Maybe you have some intuition for it but are still struggling to formalize it. But it's a bit hard for mathematicians to help until you do.
I think this is what I mean (trying to express some intuition precisely): let and be functors. Then we say that is "at least as informative as about " exactly if there exists a functor so that .
The idea is - that whatever is calculating about , that calculation can still be performed using the results of whatever is doing to .
So, two functors and should be equally informative about if there exists and so that and .
Oh, wow! The great thing about this definition is that mathematicians will automatically find it familiar and interesting. In this situation we say " factors through ". This concept makes sense and is widely studied, not just for categories and functors, but for objects and morphisms in any category.
Given objects and in any category, there's a preorder on the set of morphisms from to such that if factors through . You might enjoy checking that it's a preorder.
It's not a partial ordering because it's not true that
Whenever we have any preorder, we can define to mean and . Then is an equivalence relation.
In the particular case where the category is Cat, when you're saying " is at least as informative as ", and when you're saying " and are equally informative".
You'll notice I'm telling you the various facts at a fairly high level of generality: "in any category" and "whenever we have any preorder". This is what category theorists like to do.
That way we build up an arsenal of widely useful tools.
Ah, excellent! I will probably indeed enjoy checking that this "informativeness" (or factoring through) gives a preorder.
One reason I care about this is that one could imagine using this concept to put an ordering on some observation-generating part of an imaging system.
Although I guess it's not a very subtle ordering. But perhaps one could do more complex things like considering "informative with respect to observing property ".
And then consider a few properties at the same time.
Anyways, thanks!
Before you get too excited it might be good to check that your definition lives up to your expectations. For example, according to your definition, if A is a single point, then all functors A → B are "equally informative". Is that what you expect?
I don't think that's actually true, but it's definitely worth thinking about.
I'm pretty sure that if B is a single point then all functors A → B are "equally informative".
Ok, I see it does indeed form a preorder.
because
If and then we have and .
But then . So .
Right, the second one is the interesting part of the definition of preorder: the transitive law. The first part, the reflexive law, is kinda obvious.
@John Baez It doesn't matter whether B is a point or not. You can collapse B to a point and then map it to any other point. The relevant triangle commutes because A is just a point and cannot see that you have collapsed B to a point.
You're right. Good point (pardon the pun).
I'm considering the statement "if A is a single point, then all functors are equally informative".
Let be the category with a single object and its identity morphism.
Let be functors to .
Then is specified by the object it sends the single object of to.
Similarly, is specified by the object it sends the single object of to.
It seems like there exists a functor that sends one distinguished object to another.
It seems like and are always "equally informative" in this case.
But this makes intuitive sense to me. There isn't a lot to say about besides "it has one object". We can look at and and see that both and are informing us that has at least one object. Since there isn't anything else to say, it makes sense any observations need to be equally informative.
Well, if you believe the conclusion then I suppose you can go ahead with your definition. Personally, I do not agree – for me it is intuitive that some objects in a category are more informative than others. What is more, which objects are more informative depend on the context.
Zhen Lin Low said:
Well, if you believe the conclusion then I suppose you can go ahead with your definition. Personally, I do not agree – for me it is intuitive that some objects in a category are more informative than others. What is more, which objects are more informative depend on the context.
I think it depends on how broadly one considers the "informativeness" of an object. As you say, it depends on context.
Here I am considering a concept that describes how informative functors are with respect to a fixed object. One could consider a more broad concept that considers how informative objects are (in terms of the informativeness of the functors they support) with respect to a collection of objects, and that should lead to different conclusions.
I suppose a follow up question would be: Does this preoder on functors from to (ordered by "informativeness" or by saying if factors though ) have meets or joins?
Incidentally, I'm pretty sure that implies that is a subcategory of .
So this is (if correct) a more concrete way of saying that " observes at least as much about as does"
David Egolf said:
Incidentally, I'm pretty sure that implies that is a subcategory of .
I don't think so. For a simple counterexample, take to be (i.e. a category with one object and one morphism), take to be a category with just two objects and their identity morphisms, and let and be the two different functors .
Zhen Lin showed that if is just a point, and is any category whatsoever, and are any functors whatsoever, then always factors through ... which we're writing as .
In this situation and can each be any subcategory of that consists of a single object and its identity morphism.
So, typically is not a subcategory of .
Oh yes, good point.
I'll have to think about this some more.
So, if , then there exists an so that .
The idea I'm trying to get at is that should be sending to .
It probably does.
But that's really different than saying .
Maybe you're trying to dream up a preorder on the subcategories of a category.
For context, I was reading a paper on "generalized congruences". I think from that paper that is isomorphic to a "quotient category" of induced by , which is called in that paper. The intuition I'm trying to figure out here is that more informative observations should correspond to observing quotient categories of with less quotienting of things.
Maybe we can say that one subcategory is "contained inside of" in a general sense if there is a monomorphic functor from to . So, then, I guess I am hoping that if then there is a monomorphic functor sending to .
If this was the case, I think this could indeed end up leading to a preorder on these image subcategories.
Maybe a better way to think about this - Can we quotient to get ?
I am tempted to guess that if .
For reference, this is the quotienting operation I'm referring to:
quotient
(from "Generalized Congruences — Epimorphisms in Cat")
(Every functor induces a "generalized congruence" defined by identifying objects sent to the same object by , and identifying morphism sequences that are sent to the same morphism by upon composition in the image).
One possible chain of reasoning to relate and :
However, I need to check that each step of this is actually valid. (Note: I would need to define what I mean by successive quotienting).
One thing that would be helpful to know is this:
Does for and ?
(where is the smallest subcategory of containing )
Actually, I think we want to know if the smallest subcategory containing is the same as .
This feels really painfully messy. Maybe there is a better way to think about this.
I think this picture helps;
The quotient functor for sends to .
I believe that is isomorphic to , and so is isomorphic to a subcategory of .
That's why I have drawn monic arrows from those quotient categories into .
The top two cells and the bottom-most cell should commute.
If this is true, then .
I think this means that is mapped into the same subcategory of as is
So, I think is isomorphic to .
If this is true, this describes how different observations of the same category are related in terms of the smallest subcategory of the image they specify. If is "at least as informative as ", then you can compute the subcategory by quotienting .
As a test, say is a set with two elements viewed as a discrete category, and say is also a set with two elements. Let be a function that sends and . Let be a function that sends both elements to . Then , where sends both elements to .
In this case and . We also have that is the subcategory of corresponding to the single element and is a category with a single object and no non-identity morphisms.
Now, we want to compute . This is a category with a single object and no non-identity morphisms, as sends each element of to the same element. This is indeed isomorphic to .
So, at least in this case, we were able to compute from by doing a quotienting specified by .
I'm not sure I have the willpower to take the sketch based on that picture above and make a proper proof, but this has been interesting anyways.