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I have a question about a parenthetical remark on p.36 of Kelly’s book Basic Concepts of Enriched Category Theory. There he discusses universe-enlargement in the enriched setting, as required for the construction of functor category with non-small domain.
Assume is the category of sets in some universe, and is the category of sets in a larger universe. Typical concrete base categories for enrichment (such as ) are categories of models of some theory in , so for these we can define an enlarged base category as the category of models of the same theory in . The inclusion induces the inclusion . Kelly claims that this latter inclusion preserves all limits and colimits existing in . But then he remarks:
(We are supposing that our original universe contains infinite sets; otherwise we do not have the colimit-preservation above.)
I cannot see what kind of problem he had in mind.
Interesting. So he's claiming some colimits change when you pass from a universe of just finite sets to a universe with infinite sets?
I'm not sure what theories are allowed here, but for example, taking the theory of domains (integral commutative rings), the functor from finite domains to domains does not preserve products. In fact, since every finite domain is a field, is subterminal in finite domains, so , but in all domains that isomorphism does not hold, since there are two maps . In fact, that product does not exist in the larger category.
Neat! What's the terminal finite domain? I'm having trouble seeing why is subterminal.
I mean there is at most one morphism , because must be a (finite) field, so there is exactly one morphism if , and none otherwise.
That's a property of subterminal objects in a category that has a terminal object, but it seems like a misnomer when there isn't one :joy:
Okay, Morgan's remark explains my confusion. For me, a subterminal object is a subobject of a terminal object. But I can imagine someone defining it as an object x where hom(-,x) is always a subterminal set.
Related to the problem of expanding the universe, not covered by the assumption that there is an infinite set: I could express a negation of the axiom of choice as the statement that there is some infinite product of sets which is empty. If I manage to find/construct a universe of sets that satisfies this axiom, there seems to be no reason why the inclusion of this universe into a larger one should preserve this product.
Is "this axiom" the axiom of choice or its negation? (By "converse" you really mean "negation".)
Thanks a lot for the interesting comments! There is neither a precise definition of “theory” in Kelly’s book, nor of “universe”. Also is assumed to be at least complete and cocomplete (i.e., having all -small limits and colimits), and for that matter, to have a symmetric monoidal closed structure.
John Baez said:
Is "this axiom" the axiom of choice or its negation? (By "converse" you really mean "negation".)
I do indeed. :+1: I shall correct my comment.
Again: when you say "If I manage to find/construct a universe of sets that satisfies this axiom", does "this axiom" mean the axiom of choice or its negation?
I guess you must mean the axiom of choice, since you're talking about a product that exists in some universe, and wondering if it still exists in a larger universe.
I believe a product in some universe will remain a product in some larger universe, but I'm not sure. Set theorists would call this a question about upwards absoluteness.
I hope people don't mind a dumb question: If I wanted to consider metric (or enriching over Lawvere-type metric spaces) enriched categories, would Kelly's book be useful for this?
Yes, if you are willing to learn much more than you want to know.
That's fine. My concern was that I would get through a substantial bit and realize that it doesn't apply to my situation at all.
It all applies. But this book is famous for its high level of generality and abstraction. I haven't penetrated most of it yet.
Min Ro said:
I hope people don't mind a dumb question: If I wanted to consider metric (or enriching over Lawvere-type metric spaces) enriched categories, would Kelly's book be useful for this?
I made the description of this stream "no question is dumb" for a reason.
In my work on implementations, I rely a lot on spans where one leg is a full embedding—thus modelling "partial functors". Is there extent work on such spans? Maybe to be called "catafunctors" by opposition to "anafunctors" where on leg is surjective?
Other stupid question—my work also uses diagrams that mix "horizontal" morphisms (state transitions) with "vertical" application of a functor—am I doing it wrong? e.g. https://imgur.com/gallery/YrlN9sV
John Baez said:
Again: when you say "If I manage to find/construct a universe of sets that satisfies this axiom", does "this axiom" mean the axiom of choice or its negation?
I meant the 'naive' negation I stated, which says "there is an infinite product of non-empty sets which exists but is empty", as opposed to the axiom of choice which says "I can find an element in any infinite product of non-empty sets".
Actually I have an example. Consider the actions of on finite sets, equipped with the obvious homomorphisms. This is an elementary topos: it's cartesian closed, with products inherited from and , on which acts by composition in the first argument. The trivial action of on the two-element set gives the subobject classifier. If I take the cyclic groups of prime order as -sets, the infinite product of all of them in this category is the empty -set.
Now for a larger universe of sets than the finite ones in which countable products are defined in the way we would expect, I have a full, faithful, logical functor from the topos described above to the category of actions of on sets in the larger universe, which will also form an elementary topos. Therefore if we instead take these toposes of -sets as our universes of sets, I have described an inclusion of universes which does not preserve countable products, since the product of the prime-order -sets in the larger universe will not be empty.
(Side note: it's at times like this that I am grateful for all of the work that went into obtaining a neat axiomatisation of elementary toposes. I was able to come up with an example in a few lines thanks to that, and even if I've made an error somewhere it should be easy for someone to spot. I don't know if I could extend this to a counterexample to Kelly's claim, though, since the former topos doesn't have a natural number/infinite object.)
Why is the product in finite -sets empty? I think it just doesn't exist there.
Paolo Capriotti said:
Why is the product in finite -sets empty? I think it just doesn't exist there.
The empty set admits morphisms to all of them, and is the only -set which does up to isomorphism, so it's universal.
Ah, of course! I forgot that is not finite :blush:. Nice example!
Okay, that's a very nice example, @Morgan Rogers. Now I get what you're talking about.
I don't know if there are "universes" in the sense of ZF set theory that 1) contain infinite sets, 2) don't obey the axiom of choice but 3) embed in larger universes that do obey the axiom of choice. I should ask some logicians.
If I have a topos that models "normal ZF sans-C" and take its booleanization, as one does in topos-theoretic forcing, does that count, or does that not give you an embedding in the appropriate sense?
I was thinking about an embedding in the usual sense of model theory in classical logic, nothing about topoi. But I don't think I understand what I'm talking about well enough to proceed without a lot more thinking.
If you are only talking about model-theoretic embedding, then yes there are plenty of those exemples. The way set theorists like to build permutation models (which are typically used to break choice) is by first building a forcing extension of some model based on some poset , and then pick a filter on the group of automorphisms of which allow to define a transitive submodel of of the so called hereditarily symmetric elements of (essentially, a set of is symmetric iff the set of automorphisms falls in the chosen filter ). The construction of Cohen can be regarded as a particular case of this.
So if you have satisfying ZFC, you get the embedding that satisfies 1-3.