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A sub-object classifier in a category classifies sub-objects, or more precisely, monic arrows .
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The way I understand it is that the (contravariant) functor that maps any object to its set of monic arrows into it is represented by , i.e., we have a natural iso
My question is: is there something similar for epic arrows ?
For instance, let's define the (covariant) functor that maps any object to its set of epic arrows out of it. If is a morphism, then is the function obtained by pushing out epics out of (assuming the ambient category has push-outs).
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One may ask whether is representable or not
It's not representable in a topos, but it certainly is in the dual of a topos ;)
Try it in Set and see what happens
thanks for the hint, challenge accepted :)
Ok, I think I got it. I delved into the proof that the subobject classifier is a representing object of the functor . The naturality of yields the following commutating diagram
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This says that any subobject of is the pullback of a special subobject of . A bit of work shows that is then a terminal object.
Similarly, if we had a natural iso , then we would have a diagram
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This says that any epic is the push-out of an epic .
The same kind of work as above shows that must be an initial object.
In , this means that , which implies that , because there cannot be a function into the empty set with a non-empty domain. Then . But there exists a set with more than one iso class of surjective functions out of it. Contradiction.
Can you explain what “classify” means, in this case?
I'll try to answer, although I guess there are many ways to respond.
In my case, "classify" really means "representing" a functor. More precisely, let's say we have a contravariant functor that associates with every a specific set . We can picture an element of as a sort of data structure related to , e.g., sub-object, or epic arrows, or etc. Let's call an element of a -structure over .
The functor is representable when there exists an object such that we have a Set bijection
natural in the variable . Intuitively, this means that specifying a -structure over is the same as specifying a morphism from to the special object . In other words, the -structures are classified by the morphisms with codomain .
The advantage is that is a set, so it can be acted upon by pre/post-composing with other morphisms! In particular, when , we have .
The element that corresponds to is quite special, as witnessed by the diagram below.
This says that any -structure on an arbitrary object can be obtained by transforming (pulling-back) the -structure on along a characteristic morphism . The -structure is a sort of "universal -structure".
(note: just a word of caution, I am using the term "-structure" in an informal way. I am not referring to an actual mathematical concept. Above, it really just means an element of the set .)
A functor is “representable” if there is an object in the source category where the Hom-set between any object in the source category and is “in bijection” with whatever object F maps X to?
is a set. How do we know will be one?
I think this is a requirement of , that it is a contravariant functor into . Isn’t that the definition of a ‘presheaf’?
So we think of as associating with an object a set of something meaningfully related. It can be the set of sub-objects of , of epic arrows, or something else, but we imagine it will be some related “categorical notion”. For example, you could fix an object , and map each to . I think this is called a Hom-functor.
So if there is a bijection between whatever set maps to and some Hom-set already in the source category, it means that is a special kind of functor - a functor which is just mapping each object to a Hom-set with that object and the special object . This means that is a categorical representation of a particular “property”. Is that the idea?
That all looks pretty much right to me. The one refinement I'd point out is that while the functors and (therefore) are presheaves, i.e. contravariant functors into the functor is covariant and thus not a presheaf. However since covariant hom-functors do exist you can certainly still ask the representability question for covariant functors For complicated reasons, in practice it's often easier to prove that a presheaf is representable than that a covariant functor is, but both problems are very important.
Here is another example of representable functor.
Fix two objects and in a category . Let be the functor that maps any object to the set , i.e., pairs of arrows from to and respectively. It is a contravariant functor: for any , we obtain a function as described in this diagram:
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We just pre-compose the two arrows out of with .
Then we can wonder if is representable: is there an object of such that
It turns out that a representing object for (if it exists) is exactly the cartesian product of and .
More generally, the limit (resp. co-limit) of a diagram can be defined as a representing object of a well-chosen contravariant functor (resp. covariant functor) with values in .
Peva Blanchard said:
The same kind of work as above shows that $S$ must be an initial object.
In $Set$, this means that $S = \emptyset$, which implies that $I = \emptyset$, because there cannot be a function into the empty set with a non-empty domain. Then $F X \cong Hom(\emptyset, X) \cong 1$. But there exists a set $X$ with more than one iso class of surjective functions out of it. Contradiction.
Very thorough, well done, that argument rules out the existence of a quotient classifier in any category with a strict initial object :D
A somewhat simpler argument for Set is to observe that each subset of with at least two elements corresponds to a unique quotient by taking the cokernel (pushout with 1). So for a quotient classifier we must have ;
one can choose large enough for this to fail. I think does the trick (in fact is enough for ).
The cardinality argument is nice!
Actually, I tried to look at cardinality too, but I got a bit lost in counting the isomorphism classes of surjective functions out of . It turns out that it is related to Bell numbers as pointed out by Oscar and John on the other thread.
By the way, I am always a bit sloppy with proofs involving isomorphism classes of things. Usually, I select one representative of an iso class, and go on with my proof. Most of the time, it seems alright, but how can I know for sure?
It would be nice to work with the representative, build a proof, and check that the proof is "equivariant" with respect to the choice of a representative. Or even better, composing a proof with constructions that have been proved to be "equivariant" so that I don't even have to check the "equivariance" of the proof, i.e., the proof would be equivariant by construction.
The latter is what most of us do. Just make sure you use constructions that are 'natural' with respect to isomorphisms. Category theorists try to use such constructions whenever possible, and we don't bother to keep saying they are. We should say when our constructions are not equivariant under isomorphisms!
Moreover, there is a syntactic criterion that ensures that a construction is invariant under isomorphisms: if it can be written using the dependently-typed definition of a category without reference to equality of objects.
@Mike Shulman
That's huge, and very cool. "the dependently-typed definition of a category" ... I'm looking at [[categorical semantics of dependent type theory]]; is that a good reference for the definition you're thinking of, or should I look in the HoTT book?
No, that's something totally different. I mean https://ncatlab.org/nlab/show/category#AFamilyOfCollectionsOfMorphisms.
I think Mike is referring to FOLDS, by the way, if anybody wants a reference.
Yeah send some good folds refs! I learned it in elements wondering how it relates to Mike's comment above
FOLDS is a very general approach to results of that sort, but for ordinary categories the fact is older, I believe attributed to Freyd's 1976 "Properties invariant within equivalence types of categories" and Blanc's 1979 "Equivalence naturelle et formules logiques en theorie des categories".
And nowadays we have HoTT with univalent categories.
In relation to FOLDS in elements on page 338
Finally, relations, such as equality, are only permitted on the maximal sorts. For example, in the language of categories it is permissible to write “for all objects 𝑥 and 𝑦 and for all arrows 𝑓 and 𝑔 from 𝑥 to 𝑦, 𝑓 equals 𝑔,” asserting that the category is a pre-order. But it is not permissible to write “there exists an object 𝑥 so that for all arrows ℎ, ℎ equals ”
is this getting at what you were saying above, in the context of FOLDS?
Yes, that's the sense in which phrasing something in FOLDS is "writing it without equality of objects".
Sorry I'm late: just to say, the original question reminds me a bit of this paper by Toby Kenney. "In this paper, we examine a new approach to topos theory -- rather than considering subobjects, look at quotients."