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oh my god i just spent ages typing up a message to ask about some kind of bizarre universal property i had noticed and couldn't quite phrase right and i figured it out while typing and it's just "this universal property of everything in set A also applies to everything in this subset of A" :face_palm:
well, i'll post what i typed anyway because it's a fun little set of adjunctions and stuff
Fix a heyting algebra :
is a contravariant self-adjunction whose monad is the closure operator . Let be the set of algebras/fixed-points of this operator, the "regular elements"—explicitly, those with . Then by standard properties of Galois connections (or of idempotent monads if u wanna b fancy), is exactly the image of , and is in fact left adjoint to the inclusion .
Let be the set of decidable elements—i.e., those satisfying . We have , but this can be strict (having all instances of double negation elimination () implies that we have all instances of excluded middle (), but individual instances need not give individual decisions). I don't think the inclusion of this into either or as a whole has adjoints on either the left or the right in general.
There is nonetheless some kind of adjoint-y relationship between and , because for , we have...
(and then i realized that the property was literally just ", so the universal property of applies to things in too")
Nice! Open sets in a topological space form a Heyting algebra. Is there some nice topological way to think about the "decidable" and "regular" ones, and a nice topological example of a regular one that's not decidable?
sarahzrf said:
is exactly the image of , and is in fact left adjoint to the inclusion .
Hm, I need to think about this. I thought for a Galois connection we had ; i.e. any element of the form is "regular". but you're saying the regular elements are ones that look like . I'm probably remembering something wrong.
both are true!
anything of the form is also , so in particular it's the double negation of itself, and anything of the form is the negation of , so something is a double negation iff it is a single negation
John Baez said:
Nice! Open sets in a topological space form a Heyting algebra. Is there some nice topological way to think about the "decidable" and "regular" ones, and a nice topological example of a regular one that's not decidable?
negation in the algebra of opens is exterior iirc (i.e., complement minus boundary)
so the decidable opens are the ones such that —a little fiddling shows that this is true iff has no boundary, i.e. is clopen
the regular ones i think are a little subtler
an open can fail to be regular if adding part of its boundary gives something that is still open, i think
in , notorious examples of irregulars are sets missing a few isolated points, but intervals, for example, are regular i think
honestly though you don't need to turn to topology or work externally to see regular propositions that aren't decidable
any negation is regular, but only a select few negations are decidable!
btw, a fun fact: extends to a functor from the category of heyting algebras to the category of boolean algebras— is always a boolean algebra (but its disjunction is not the same as 's)!—and this functor is in fact the left adjoint to the inclusion from boolean algebras to heyting algebras 🤯
the unit is exactly double negation
so it's, like, an adjunction inside an adjunction
this is the semantic end of the double negation translation i guess
i've meant for a while now to work thru it in a lot more detail but ive never gotten around to it...
hmm, for some reason i thought the unit of a reflective subcategory was called the "reflector", is that not the term :thinking:
sarahzrf said:
i really fuckin need to read the coend book one of these days :sob:
God me too . . . i think this might be a good candidate for a reading group topic if more people are interested
sarahzrf said:
btw, a fun fact: extends to a functor from the category of heyting algebras to the category of boolean algebras— is always a boolean algebra (but its disjunction is not the same as 's)!—and this functor is in fact the left adjoint to the inclusion from boolean algebras to heyting algebras 🤯
the reflector is exactly double negation
so it's, like, an adjunction inside an adjunction
Great! This sounds like the nice modern way to talk about what people traditionally call the double-negation translation relating classical and intuitionistic logic. I like this modern version!
Here's a puzzle I've never figured out, which you seem like the perfect person to solve:
The opposite of a Heyting algebra is called a co-Heyting algebra: a poset with finite limits and colimits where for each , the map has a left adjoint. Just as Heyting algebras formalize the intuitionistic propositional calculus where we drop the law of excluded middle, co-Heyting algebras formalize the paraconsistent propositional calculus where we drop the principle of noncontradiction. A poset that's both a Heyting algebra and co-Heyting algebra is called a bi-Heyting algebra.
Puzzle. What's an example of a bi-Heyting algebra that's not a Boolean algebra?
I've heard that examples exist, but I've never seen one that I could understand.
double-negation translation is a syntactic thing! what i'm describing is semantic!
it's possible that you can recover it by applying this to some free algebra or something, but it's not quite the same thing a priori
(also, i already said so :mischievous:)
sarahzrf said:
this is the semantic end of the double negation translation i guess
hmm, interesting that examples apparently exist
i think ive heard that if a category is an elementary topos and so is its opposite, then it has to be trivial, and this seems like a truncation of that
EDIT: aha, it was
Any category which is both cartesian closed and co-cartesian co-closed is a preorder
so that should imply what i said, but certainly isn't a dealbreaker when working with preorders
maybe the triviality is just because of size issues that dont come into play here, like how the adjoint functor theorem works for posets :thinking:
Okay, so "semantic end of the double negation translation" is a more precise way to say what I said, namely "modern version". It's a bit like how Lawvere theories take universal algebra and strip off some of the distracting syntactic fussiness.
if "modern" means "semantic, neglecting the syntactic end", then i want no part of modernity :triumph:
I want it.
well, my specialty is programming languages, so perhaps i'm biased :)
Yes, if you talk to computers a lot you've gotta care about syntax. I mainly talk to people precisely for this reason.
(I'm sort of kidding; I used to study formal logic...)
trying to make sense of a left adjoint to - ∨ R
hmm
Yes, it's really freaky at first! I eventually got used to it, and now I've sort of forgotten it.
(also: syntax is an incredibly powerful tool for manufacturing adjunctions, but i'll let that argument go :upside_down:)
All I mean is that I'm usually more interested in groups than group presentations, more interested in Lawvere theories than universal algebra as described by a chosen set of function symbols obeying a chosen set of axioms, more interested in posets than ways of writing these posets as sets of equivalence classes of symbols strings, and so on - the thing presented has more symmetry than the presentation.
but how much do you learn about groups from the study of their presentations, and from the fact that group presentations are a thing?
A lot!
But I think of that as a tool for studying something I'm interested in, not the thing I'm interested in.
hmm :)
when it comes to groups, there's maybe a stronger argument
but i think heyting algebras were invented in order to give semantics to intuitionistic logic
regardless, though—
i prefer to avoid thinking of either as purely a tool for studying the other
they push on each other!
Yes, that's very reasonable.
I just find logicians and programmers are too much into syntax for me to ever really be one - just a matter of taste.
no accounting for it
Said the accountant to the mathematician...
:weary:
Anyway, that nLab page on co-Heyting algebras has a bunch of fun stuff about that left adjoint, which they call "subtraction".
But it's probably more fun to think about it oneself for a while.
oh that's fucked up because i decided on a minus sign to write it while messing around
on the right track >:)
or maybe i just remembered having seen it vaguely
Part of why it'd be so cool to have bi-Heyting algebras that weren't boolean is that you've have this extra logical operation that's weirdly dual to implication and not have it reduce to other things... it seems like a kind of wonderland of adjoints.
(P ∨ forall x, Q x) <-> (forall x, P ∨ Q x)
^this is unsettling
and rather classical-looking
actually it makes me suspicious of whether it's reasonable to expect to be able to find non-boolean co-heyting algebras with very much completeness in a constructive metatheory
suppose we knew there was a complete co-heyting algebra —then let be an arbitrary subsingleton set, and
is basically the -internal statement " is inhabited", and is basically the -internal statement " is empty"
so if we take this embedding of external truth values into an arbitrary complete lattice, then if that complete lattice is in fact a co-heyting algebra, we must have a strong excluded middle in it for those embedded truth values, which i find incredibly suspect, because in constructive metatheories most complete lattices get their completeness from power sets
buuuuuuut i suppose this is a big sidetrack.
it's almost 3:30am, i don't have the patience for this, i'm gonna go look on the nlab page :upside_down:
Co-Heyting algebras were initially called Brouwerian algebras.
hahahaaha poor brouwer must be rolling over in his grave
image.png
:eyes::eyes::eyes::eyes:
i should, like, learn some quantum mechanics
beyond the point of "solve this time-independent schrödinger equation we gave you in order to figure out some energy eigenstates for a particle in a box"
actually, this co-heyting algebra stuff & this boundary operator & whatnot are interesting—i guess double co-heyting-negation would be interior instead of closure?
i was thinking recently about the fact that a lawvere-tierney topology defines a closure rather than an interior
ok this has gotten very far from "universal constructions"
John Baez said:
Puzzle. What's an example of a bi-Heyting algebra that's not a Boolean algebra?
I've heard that examples exist, but I've never seen one that I could understand.
OK, according to popular sources, every totally ordered set is a Heyting algebra where for , otherwise. Which gave me an idea :smiling_devil:.
We dually set the subtraction for and (!!!) otherwise. This satisfies the adjointness condition . I'll do the case. So we have . If then and so . If then . Between and , it has to be that , thus completing the direction.
Now suppose this totally ordered set of ours has a "dangling" element , such that . That means that our totally ordered set is absolutely not a Boolean algebra! In fact, this dangling element is also "paraconsistent" as . Where do we find such a set with a dangling element? Well, my (borrowed) counterexample to the first puzzle was exactly that!
John Baez said:
I've heard that examples exist, but I've never seen one that I could understand.
OK, my example should work (unless I made a mistake), but do we actually understand it? What's the lesson here? For me, the lesson is that I should stop trying to make logical sense (in the "classical" meaning of logic) of these sets because them not being Boolean algebras prohibits one from doing so! Free oneself from such constraints, and these funny elements in the sets make perfect sense :).
image.png
yknow, it had vaguely occurred to me that you might be able to get coheyting stuff out of a model of linear logic in the same way that you get heyting stuff—and i think im gonna do that in a minute—but it just occurred to me that ive seen this before!!
or, well, something similar to it
sarahzrf said:
image.png
yknow, it had vaguely occurred to me that you might be able to get coheyting stuff out of a model of linear logic in the same way that you get heyting stuff—and i think im gonna do that in a minute—but it just occurred to me that ive seen this before!!
I hardly know any linear logic, but I've made a quick read in (https://golem.ph.utexas.edu/category/2018/05/linear_logic_for_constructive.html) and it looks like these are weakened compared to Heyting algebras. So I would guess that you might be able to get a similarly weakened co-Heyting thing :P.
the intuitionistic implication in linear logic is , which here is , where ? is dual to !
also, that screenshot is from the same paper :)
sarahzrf said:
also, that screenshot is from the same paper :)
Hahahah what a delightful coincidence!
i really recommend taking a look at it! iirc andrej bauer (i think it was him?) said he thought it was the most important paper in constructivism in the last... well, i dont want to misquote what time period he said, but it was probably some number of years
plus it gives an extremely useful viewpoint on linear logic other than the "logic of resources" one, which i think is sorely needed in popularization
Will do then, thanks for the recommendation :).
er, i cant remember whether it invents that viewpoint, but it certainly presents it
sarahzrf said:
plus it gives an extremely useful viewpoint on linear logic other than the "logic of resources" one, which i think is sorely needed in popularization
I have a bunch of colleagues in my uni that are messing around with linear logic exactly because they think they accurately represent programmer's intentions when wanting to pass on "resources" in a secure manner. Hmmm...
no, it's good for that! it's just that that's the only one i usually hear people talk about, except maybe in actual brass tacks linear logic papers
i'd love to see more of its facets acknowledged in its popular image
sarahzrf said:
no, it's good for that! it's just that that's the only one i usually hear people talk about, except maybe in actual brass tacks linear logic papers
I agree! The biggest problem is that they're looking to also implement a processor with linear logic primitives (linear capabilities) as hardware primitives. Which is a very touch task, if you want the performance to be somewhat tolerable. And, alas, without decent performance, it's tough convincing people on the practical side of things through formal arguments alone :/.
I should convince them to join the zulip! Most likely they'll go "Oh no, not this again" and roll their eyes. Bah, plebs!
i honestly dont know whats reasonable in this day and age, cpus are insane
although to be fair, insane cpus are usually designed by companies like intel
okay this is WAY off topic from "universal constructions" :|
is there a way to fork a topic
Fork a topic fast? I don't know. But we can just modify the topics.
But it's cool, nobody will notice hihi. :zip_it:
@sarahzrf: yes, if you edit a post, you can change the topic name to fork it into a separate topic
you can actually edit the topics of anyone's posts, which makes it easier to clean things up
oh neat
don't mind if i do...
(though, it'd be super neat to be able to just select exactly which messages you want to fork)
hope no one minds, honestly this is basically what i derailed to
as i always do >.>
Oh, the off-topicness was going waaaaay back! OK, that's cool :).
@sarahzrf What does stand for?
"regular"—i did mention that, but it was probably easy to miss
btw here's my source for the stuff i saw saying about adjunctions w/ boolean algebras https://ncatlab.org/nlab/show/Heyting+algebra#ToBooleanAlgebras
Thanks! :)
Sub(1) in a presheaf topos would be an example of a bi-heyting algebra that's not boolean, wouldn't it?
what makes it bi-heyting?
It is bi-heyting for the same reason that powersets are bi-heyting, I think of these as intuitionistic powersets. The nLab page on bi-heyting toposes cites a slick proof.
vikraman said:
It is bi-heyting for the same reason that powersets are bi-heyting, I think of these as intuitionistic powersets. The nLab page on bi-heyting toposes cites a slick proof.
It is a very slick proof! So the next question is: what's the co-Heyting operation?
I'm unable to type in the LaTeX but I think this is the structure
(you need two dollar signs)
(also the last \superseteq
is misspelled)
it's supseteq
, I think:
and \setminus
for backslash
(the joys of LaTeX!)
vikraman said:
That's the definition of a co-Heyting operation, but I was trying to ask "what does the co-Heyting operation concretely do in a given presheaf topos?" If I take the simplest non-Boolean example of presheaves on the category , for instance, what is the co-Heyting operation on a subobject lattice Sub(X)?
In terms of sieves or cribles? I don't have a good intuition for those but I will try to think.
that's not co-heyting, that's the formula for a right adjoint to i can't fucking read
is a product in the dual and has a right adjoint, making it a co-heyting algebra, isn't that correct?
So, I tweeted about bi-Heyting algebras, as one does, and I learned something that it seems you folks have already learned:
Any totally ordered set with a top and bottom element is a bi-Heyting algebra, and if this set has more than 2 elements it's not a Boolean algebra.
So, a very nice bi-Heyting but non-Boolean algebra is the totally ordered set {false, maybe, true}. A very simple 3-valued logic!
It may seem hard to think and do math while avoiding the "law of excluded middle" - the axiom that says for any proposition P, either P or not P. In fact you can get used to avoiding it. I know lots of mathematicians who can. It's an ability you can turn on and off. (1/n)
- John Carlos Baez (@johncarlosbaez)yeah, i misread supseteq as subseteq
This is the subobject classifier in or
John Baez said:
So, I tweeted about bi-Heyting algebras, as one does, and I learned something that it seems you folks have already learned:
Any totally ordered set with a top and bottom element is a bi-Heyting algebra, and if this set has more than 2 elements it's not a Boolean algebra.
So, a very nice bi-Heyting but non-Boolean algebra is the totally ordered set {false, maybe, true}. A very simple 3-valued logic!
Yes, that looks about right :).
hmm, so i wonder
if a bi-heyting algebra is supposed to allow you to talk about both closures and interiors, is there some way of getting an interesting bi-heyting algebra out of a topological space? i was gonna suggest the borel algebra but that's boolean (in classical foundations at least)
oh, you know what i wanna know now? what is the computational content of all this
okay so it probably all comes back to linear logic, i never did think that thru...
I don't know how to get a bi-Heyting algebra out of a topological space in an interesting way.
But this nLab article is nice:
https://ncatlab.org/nlab/show/bi-Heyting+topos
It shows the lattice of subobjects of any object in any presheaf category is bi-Heyting!
For example the lattice of subgraphs of a graph (using the category theorist's definition of "graph".)
So I now have vast numbers of bi-Heyting algebras to play with. :cowboy:
@John Baez in particular, your example of 3-valued logic is also an instance of this, since it is the subobject classifier of presheaves over
Great, I was wondering about this and failing miserably to see how it was an example.
So all totally ordered sets with top and bottom are also an instance of this.
But it seems much more fun now to have non-totally-ordered bi-Heyting algebras.
I haven't worked this through, but I think I can give another large class from the description. We know that finite joins distributing over potentially infinite meets = complete heyting algebra. Dually, finite meets over potentially infinite joins must = complete co-heyting algebra. When both hold, you get a bi-heyting algebra. A nice large case when both hold is any finite distributive lattice.
haha i googled "finite distributive lattice" and image.png
Nice! That's a big class, the finite distributive lattices. It's also nice that the opposite category of FinDistLat is FinPoset, so any finite poset gives a finite distributive lattice and thus a bi-Heyting algebra.
To get the finite distributive lattice corresponding to a finite poset , first form the poset of upsets in with the reverse ordering (this is the free finite meet completion on ). Then form the distributive lattice of downsets in that. This is the free distributive lattice on .
I'm sort of quoting the nLab, but I sort of wrote this part, to help me remember it.
Right, that's the free distributive lattice. But that's not the birkhoff duality you describe. For that, just form the downsets, and you're done! (In the other direction, take the join-irreducible/join-prime elements to get the poset back).
(you can also do the same thing with upsets and meets if you prefer).
i saw the word "downset" so just a quick note to anyone who might not know: downward-closed sets are (0, 1)-presheaves and taking x↓ is the (0, 1)-yoneda embedding
(and the inclusions of downward-closed sets are some sort of fibration, maybe even the discrete ones... need to work that out (and whether "discrete" makes sense in this context))
Right, that's the free distributive lattice. But that's not the birkhoff duality you describe. For that, just form the downsets, and you're done! (In the other direction, take the join-irreducible/join-prime elements to get the poset back.
Hmm, then perhaps I screwed up the nLab page. Oh, no, maybe I just misread it. Maybe you could check it:
and either fix errors or tell me about them. It would be nice to make the explanation better, too.
i just realized that the universal property i was thinking about with and might not have been as trivial as i decided after all
well, ok, so what got me thinking about it again is that coq's ssreflect
library defines a thing called classically
like so:
Definition classically P : Prop := forall b : bool, (P -> b) -> b.
(there's a coercion registered from bool
to Prop
so that b
can be written there as if it were a proposition)
now, this is easily equivalent to double negation
because it's the same as ((P -> true) -> true) /\ ((P -> false) -> false)
, and false <-> False
(where lowercase true
and false
are booleans being coerced to propositions, while uppercase True
and False
are fundamentally propositions, so logically equivalent but not judgmentally equal)
but the reason why it's defined this way is for convenience of use—say you want to prove a goal which is a boolean coerced into a proposition, and you know H : classically P
; then you can just apply H
directly to your goal b
and now you need to prove P -> b
—you've weakened your goal using H
whereas if it were defined as double negation, this use case would have to be a lemma
but anyway: this felt to me like it was saying something like...
"P
as perceived by booleans is indistinguishable from ~ ~ P
"
which would be the criterion for a reflection, except that ~ ~ P
need not be decidable, so i thought something odd was going on
and then i decided that it was as simple as what i said earlier, but... now i'm suspicious again, because it seems as though we can maybe say that the reflection of into is somehow "generated" by
so, ok, if we have we can contravariantly yoneda-embed it to get , then we can restrict that along the inclusion of either or of to get a copresheaf on one of those. the fact that we have a reflection into says that restricting along the inclusion into there gives us (where is considered as an element of ), but it's possible that the restriction to is not representable at all.
i swear i was going somewhere with this...
oh!
i think maybe we have something like... "if restricting and to gives the same thing, then it already does when you restrict to "
or rather, i think thats the correct statement of what i vaguely wanted to say the whole time, but now im no longer sure it's actually true :sweat_smile:
OKAY, here's a question!
say a poset is markovian if for any monotone function , we have
of course, classically every poset is markovian
markov's principle states that the discrete poset is markovian
now: if is markovian, does it follow that is markovian?? or does anybody have a brouwerian counterexample?
neither is instantly obvious to me, and i'm wondering if maybe i should instead define markovian as , which i believe is equivalent to being markovian under my current definition
I wonder if this is the right topic, but I've just implemented Lawvere topologies (in Grothendieck toposes) in Scala: https://github.com/vpatryshev/Categories/blob/master/src/main/scala/math/cat/topos/LawvereTopology.scala
Comments/contributions welcome.
ok i found my brouwerian counterexample :triumph:
constructively: is markovian (as is anything with a greatest element), but if under the standard ordering is markovian, then it also is when it is discrete, which is just markov's principle
:sad:
this is a pain...
i wanted to be able to state "this satisfies LPO" as "decidable propositions are closed under quantification by monotone functions from this thing"
but i think that's not equivalent to "we can decide between forall holds and exists counterexample"
because converting between them hinges on being able to instantiate w/ a negated version, but that switches variance!
does anybody know if there's work on generalizations of omniscience principles to ordered domains of discourse?
is martin escardo maybe on this server...? :-)
What is ? I thought with would require that every is constant.
So it would be Markovian, just like the opposite.
Is actually the Sierpinski space?
sorry yeah
well no
it's the Sierpinski space in the sense that it has the ordering you're thinking of
but it's not the Sierpinski space in the sense that it's not the power set of the singleton, since we're working intuitionistically
Yeah. The walking arrow or whatever.
Btw John, thanks for the push. I fixed things up a bit and added some more tidbits.
this seems like a possibly good place to mention that for a while now ive been working on a coq development of all kinds of depleted category theory (term ive coined for truth-value enriched / (0, 1)-category theory / category theory specialized to preorders)
goal is to be something where you can one day think to yourself "hmmmmmmm separating conjunction is Just™ depleted day convolution" and then immediately be able to actually get something out of this in coq by just doing, say
Require Import depleted.psh. Definition program_state : Type := ... Instance program_state_proset : Proset program_state := ... Instance program_state_promonoidal : Promonoidal program_state := ... Definition assertion : Type := PSh program_state.
and bam, now writing ⊗ means separating conjunction
and you get all of your logical connectives for free from structure on (depleted) presheaves
or, say, you read about linear logic for constructivism, go "oh shit that sounds really cool", decide you want to play with the chu construction
great, you already have complete heyting algebras and a bunch of lemmas about them to play with, and the ordering on a product, and stuff like that, that should be plenty to make you not lose momentum when you realize how much basic theory you were taking for granted if you have adhd like me :upside_down:
well, that's my ideal here for what function this development should be able to serve, anyway
hope it sounds appealing to someone other than me :-)
dunno how many coq users there are here
(this is why i was asking about the "markovian" stuff—i'm working on a module for this development with some of the results from that escardó omniscience paper, like the omniscience of the conats, so that if you want to use bool
instead of Prop
in some places like depleted presheaves for computability purposes, you can still talk about what kinds of infs/sups it's possible to take)
(and since im working with all kinds of preordered sets, asking about restriction to only monotone predicates seemed like a natural generalization)
I'm not an expert on this kind of stuff, but it seems cool so I appreciate you talking about it here!
this sounds like it could be a really useful project for gaining intuition for some of the more sophisticated categorical constructions and putting it in a more familiar context!
oh it definitely has been @_@
(even not considering the Coq library)
depleted category theory (term ive coined for truth-value enriched / (0, 1)-category theory / category theory specialized to preorders)
did you consider "thin category theory"?
hmmmmm, im not sure i did, and it does seem more immediately obvious to more people, if less punny
although, um
there's a certain shift in perspective, i think, between thinking of an object as a "thin category" and as a "(0, 1)-category"
which is my rationalization for why i wanna stick to "depleted" :>
if i say "i have this thin category C, and then a presheaf F on it", then you're probably gonna assume it takes values in Set
if i say "i have this (0, 1)-category C, and then a presheaf F on it", then you should assume it takes values in truth values!
that's probably a fair assumption
and coming up with names for things is half the fun :P
i guess there's a point to be made that if you say you're doing "thin category theory", that suggests that you're only working with thin categories, and hence you shuoldnt be considering presheaves outside of the second kind
but. i like my term =w=
oh, depleted is the opposite of enriched?
yes haha
at least when you talk about uranium, i think
and there are certainly people who treat category theory as if it were radioactive...
only in category theory do you get something enriched when you deplete...
well, no, that's my logic—it's "enriched", but in fact the category you enrich over (truth values) is strictly less rich than the default (Set), so you're not really enriching, you're depleting
I keep advocating for "impoverished", but the uranium analogy makes me understand "depleted" a bit better.
"depleted" rolls off the tongue better :smirk:
Are there foods which are specially modified to have less vitamin D, or whatever?
lol
gluten-free categories
we already have burritos, tacos and enchiladas
functors G and F, pronounced ‘gluten’ and ‘free’ respectively,
If we have gluten free functors, they must be adjoint to some gluten forgetful functor :thinking:
also I like depleted because it comes from a nicely nounable verb; you can talk about “depletion” functors or “depleting” a category when moving between categories you enrich over. (enriching over truth values thus gives a (nontrivial) “maximally depleted” version of—I want to say—any category enriched over [a category with an initial object]? (maybe not, I’m not sure yet. Something that works in a special way with the composition/something like a “monoidal zero”. Concept is out there, I just don’t know it yet!) Anyway, the depletion from such an enriched category to one enriched over truth values suggests the usage of “depleted” given here)
@Jade Master youll be pleased to know that my depleted CT development includes definitions of quantales and depleted day convolution, so u could formalize that blog post extremely quickly in it by just defining the monoidal proset generated by a petri net ^__^
Ooh interesting. I'd love to do something with this...
do you know any coq
I don't but I want to learn!
since i guess ive turned this into the (0, 1)-category theory topic
what's a (1, 1)-filter?
actually a (1, 1)-ideal is probably a better idea
actually no
i think a (1, 1)-filter might be a flat functor to Set
but i'd need to figure out the definition of flat functors first :upside_down:
sarahzrf said:
since i guess ive turned this into the (0, 1)-category theory topic
Can I just get some clarity about what the indices mean in eg (0,1)-category? You hinted at it earlier, but I figure I should make sure I'm understanding right
An -categories is a category with "levels" of morphisms (objects are -morphisms) and such that every morphism above level is invertible
Beware that we tacitily assume there are always infinitely many level of morphisms, albeit an -category has only one morphism (up to isomorphism) above level .
So it makes sense to talk about -categories for
A -category has a non-trivial collection of objects (-level), and a trivial collection of -morphisms between any two objects (-level). Since , you can have non-invertible -morphisms. Hence your category is a poset.
A -category has a non-trivial collection of objects (-level), a non-trivial collection of -morphisms between any two objects (-level) and a trivial collection of -morphisms between any parallel -morphisms. Since , you can have non-invertible -morphisms. Hence your category is a normal category.
A -category has non-trivial objects and -morphisms, trivial -morphisms and every -morphism is invertible. Hence your category is a groupoid!
Beware: 'trivial' means either a singleton or empty, 'non-trivial' means 'not necessarily trivial' :sweat_smile:
Thanks! That clears that up.
@Matteo Capucci This makes -categories setoids (set + equivalence relation) and not sets, right?
In fact I think this should always allow that there is an equivalence relation on parallel -morphisms in an -category...
Indeed... that's funny.
I don't know then
Oh, I don't think that's a problem. I noticed this kind of thing arising when one tries to pass from
“-categories as -dimensional things + composition operation on -cells”
to
“-categories as -dimensional things that are 'trivial' above ”
When you turn the composition into -dimensional “compositors”
Because to pass from the first to the second you would need to introduce some -cells, and then you would make the most economical choice: do not duplicate any -cells!
But to obtain something equivalent to the first from the second, you would need to state that as an additional property: there are no duplicates...
And this -business, as you say, is done from the second perspective rather than the first
Besides, it makes constructivists happier, so why not?
You should consider categories up to equivalence, so that setoids and sets are the same. Also by the same logic, a (0, 1)-category would be a preorder, not a partial order (a partial order is a preorder in which ).
That's context-dependent, though. If we are considering these -things as special -things, then they are not stable under equivalence, e.g. a set would be equivalent to any disjoint union of contractible -groupoids.
The definition as given by Matteo needs some mentions of strict equality.
Unless maybe we want to replace every mention of “uniqueness” with “contractible space of choices”...
(Which is what you get if you stated it in HoTT, I guess.)
If you're working in some -context then you should generally interpret "unique" as "contractible space of choices".
We were defining some -things, but nobody said we were doing it in an -context :)
I guess I was thinking more of “defining what the -categories are in a specific model of higher categories”.
Yeah it's not really a problem to have equivalences in the last level, yet I can't reconcile it with whta is mentioned here https://ncatlab.org/nlab/show/%28n%2Cr%29-category
Like, the definition and the 'periodic table' disagree, as @Amar Hadzihasanovic points out
note that in general, an (n, r)-category for r > n is only interesting when r = n+1
larger r is equivalent to that
and r = n+1 means you have a preorder on the highest-level cells
sarahzrf said:
i just realized that the universal property i was thinking about with and might not have been as trivial as i decided after all
HAHAHA i came back to this just now and i figured it out :D
wait, i think that's right.
ok nvm i realized that the reasoning i was working on only really applied to the heyting algebra of truth values >.>
might still be true but uhhh i dont know