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Thank you.
What then is the category of sets?
I see. Yes, this may be the most immediate issue, since there is no set of all sets.
One solution to this is the introduction of “classes”. As I understand it, the main function of classes is that they act almost like sets, but they avoid Russell’s paradox because they are of a different type, than sets. In other words, we can contain “all sets” in something, as long as it is not a set. Could we then simply claim there are 0-sets, 1-sets, 2-sets, etc., each a distinct type?
Also, if we define “category” as “small category”, is the point that we have implied the existence of large categories in doing so? For example, merely by stating the existence of the category of all small categories, we can ask the question, “What then is ?”
Or, could there be a theory (a collection of formulas) with a model that does not contain any large categories? I mean a restricted form of category theory where large categories technically don’t exist.
Julius Hamilton said:
Thank you.
What then is the category of sets?
I see. Yes, this may be the most immediate issue, since there is no set of all sets.
One solution to this is the introduction of “classes”. As I understand it, the main function of classes is that they act almost like sets, but they avoid Russell’s paradox because they are of a different type, than sets. In other words, we can contain “all sets” in something, as long as it is not a set. Could we then simply claim there are 0-sets, 1-sets, 2-sets, etc., each a distinct type?
Yes! This tower of sets is basically the idea behind Grothendieck universes, and universe hierarchies in type theories like CIC or MLTT used resp. in Coq and Agda.
Julius Hamilton said:
Also, if we define “category” as “small category”, is the point that we have implied the existence of large categories in doing so? For example, merely by stating the existence of the category of all small categories, we can ask the question, “What then is ?”
Or, could there be a theory (a collection of formulas) with a model that does not contain any large categories? I mean a restricted form of category theory where large categories technically don’t exist.
You could develop category theory in the context of "small categories", except that then you cannot talk about some categories that ought to be of interest to you. For example, you cannot talk about , and so presheaf categories are out of reach as well.
Thanks. I’m going to try to keep threads shorter and ask small questions in new threads. I’m marking this as resolved, but feel free to continue the conversation and add more input.
Julius Hamilton has marked this topic as resolved.
I’m really enjoying this paper so far. 3E7F28C9-2C2E-423A-8732-9B9993B80612.png