You're reading the public-facing archive of the Category Theory Zulip server.
To join the server you need an invite. Anybody can get an invite by contacting Matteo Capucci at name dot surname at gmail dot com.
For all things related to this archive refer to the same person.
Super vague question: anyone have any fun examples of using cardinals larger than in category theory? Like specific examples of -filtered colimits or something. Not really sure what I'm looking for here
I think you are more or less asking if big cardinals are useful outside of set theory :P
Anyway an obvious place to look I guess would be foundations of category theory, where people discuss about which constructions/things are possible and which ones aren't :slight_smile:
I guess that is what I'm asking, but I think "useful" can be interpreted very broadly haha
Maybe any place that one applies the machinery of locally presentable categories to categories that are not locally finitely presentable?
Reuben Stern said:
Super vague question: anyone have any fun examples of using cardinals larger than in category theory? Like specific examples of -filtered colimits or something. Not really sure what I'm looking for here
You can have -ary extensive categories, for example.
@David Michael Roberts, would you like to comment further?
The category of Banach spaces and short maps is aleph_1-presentable, for example.
Or consider the setup for condensed sets, where one takes a fibred topos over the partially ordered class of uncountable strong limit cardinals.
In each fibre one really does use that cardinality bound to ensure one has a Grothendieck topos.
David Michael Roberts said:
The category of Banach spaces and short maps is aleph_1-presentable, for example.
Good discussion here on some consequences/details of this: https://math.stackexchange.com/questions/1424777/is-the-category-of-banach-spaces-and-bounded-linear-maps-accessible
David Michael Roberts said:
Or consider the setup for condensed sets, where one takes a fibred topos over the partially ordered class of uncountable strong limit cardinals.
Here's a quick backgrounder for condensed sets.
Not that Clausen and Scholze use this terminology, but that is what they are doing (man, I wish people would read SGA4 more! Including me :-P)
I'm not sure whether this counts as "in category theory", but when interpreting dependent type theory into a category we generally need inaccessible cardinals to construct universe objects closed under the type constructors.
Using Vopěnka's principle, Cisinski showed that every "A-localizer" is accessible. Combined with the rest of his theory, what that means is: in the category of presheaves on some small category A, if you have a class of morphisms W which looks like it should be the weak equivalences in a model structure where the cofibrations are the monomorphisms (i.e., W is an A-localizer), then in fact such a model structure exists and the acyclic cofibrations are generated by a set of morphisms (i.e., the model structure is cofibrantly generated).
See section 1.4 of his '06 book (in French). Looking more closely at it now, I see that he also cites this paper by Casacuberta, Scevenels, and Smith.
Vopěnka's principle is nice because it's a large cardinal axiom that can be stated in a way category theorists can like:
Every discrete full subcategory of a locally presentable category is small.
Here's another way to state it:
No full subcategory of the category of graphs is equivalent to the category of ordinals.
Here's a way to state Vopěnka's principle that I think many category theorists would like even better:
Every full subcategory of a locally presentable category that's closed under colimits is coreflective.
Similarly, we can state "weak Vopěnka's principle" as
Every full subcategory of a locally presentable category that's closed under limits is reflective.
Mike Shulman said:
I'm not sure whether this counts as "in category theory", but when interpreting dependent type theory into a category we generally need inaccessible cardinals to construct universe objects closed under the type constructors.
Relatedly, induction-recursion is related to the existence of an external Mahlo cardinal as in http://www.cse.chalmers.se/~peterd/papers/InductionRecursionInitialAlgebras.pdf
Gershom said:
Mike Shulman said:
I'm not sure whether this counts as "in category theory", but when interpreting dependent type theory into a category we generally need inaccessible cardinals to construct universe objects closed under the type constructors.
Relatedly, induction-recursion is related to the existence of an external Mahlo cardinal as in http://www.cse.chalmers.se/~peterd/papers/InductionRecursionInitialAlgebras.pdf
Even in a predicative theory? Or is this a "predicative Mahlo cardinal"?
In a predicative theory it's similar, but the whole theory is weaker, so the notion of inaccessibility changes.
So people talk more about recursive inaccessibility.
FWIW, I don't think the Mahlo is intrinsic to the notion of induction-recursion, just that it's needed for the commonest choice about the rules for universe indices in inductive-recursive definitions. But there should be other ways to state such rules that don't require a Mahlo.
Matt Feller said:
Using Vopěnka's principle, Cisinski showed that every "A-localizer" is accessible. Combined with the rest of his theory, what that means is: in the category of presheaves on some small category A, if you have a class of morphisms W which looks like it should be the weak equivalences in a model structure where the cofibrations are the monomorphisms (i.e., W is an A-localizer), then in fact such a model structure exists and the acyclic cofibrations are generated by a set of morphisms (i.e., the model structure is cofibrantly generated).
In light of Simon Henry's recent work, I wonder if the last result could be weakened to a weak model category and lose the assumption of Vopěnka's principle?
Matt Feller said:
Using Vopěnka's principle, Cisinski showed that every "A-localizer" is accessible. Combined with the rest of his theory, what that means is: in the category of presheaves on some small category A, if you have a class of morphisms W which looks like it should be the weak equivalences in a model structure where the cofibrations are the monomorphisms (i.e., W is an A-localizer), then in fact such a model structure exists and the acyclic cofibrations are generated by a set of morphisms (i.e., the model structure is cofibrantly generated).
In light of Simon Henry's recent work, might it be possible to weaken the result to be a weak model category, and in the process, drop the Vopenka assumption. (Sorry, wrote this ages ago but it never sent).
In ZFC, consider for any infinite ordinal and . Are all functions in our theory already forming a set on the level , making this Neumann level catesian closed?
I asked because I read is a nice topos, but I don't quite know if that means all conceivable functions are already covered in it, nor whether these statements extend to other ordinals.
Nikolaj Kuntner said:
In ZFC, consider for any infinite ordinal and . Are all functions in our theory already forming a set on the level , making this Neumann level catesian closed?
I asked because I read is a nice topos, but I don't quite know if that means all conceivable functions are already covered in it, nor whether these statements extend to other ordinals.
I think is cartesian closed whenever $\alpha$ is a limit ordinal, like .
Proof: if and is limit, then there exists a with . Then , thus since is closed under subsets, and therefore . QED
In particular is also cartesian closed and thus a topos, but it doesn't have a 'natural numbers object' (NNO), since all elements of are finite. Thus, to get an elementary topos with NNO, we have to iterate the powerset functor at least up to the second limit ordinal .
Nice! That sounds right to me.
One interesting thing is that 0, 1 and would count as inaccessible cardinals if the definition didn't explicitly rule them out.
Adding to @Jonas Frey's comment, it is also necessary for to be a limit ordinal. In general, if we define to be the least ordinal with (i.e. first appears in ), then we have . From this, one can see that for any ordinal, and . In particular, if , then we have , and the rank of any set containing must be at least . Thus, cannot be an element of .